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The Aftermath of Erie v. Tompkins ........................... 590
Freight Train, Freight Train,
Run so fast.
Please don’t tell what train I’m on.
They won’t know what route I’m going. 1
I.PROLOGUE

At about 2:30 a.m. on Friday, July 27, 1934, William Colwell of
Hughestown, Pennsylvania was awakened by two young men banging on
his front door. When he went downstairs, they told him that someone had
been run over by a train. Colwell looked out his side window. In the
moonlight, he saw someone lying on the ground near the railroad tracks. 2
He went back upstairs and told his wife that there had been an accident.
She told him “not to go out, that them fellows was crazy,” but he dressed
and went out to help anyway.
Colwell’s house was at the stub-end of Hughes Street, where it ran
into the railroad tracks. When he reached the tracks, he discovered his
neighbor Harry James Tompkins, about 6 or 10 feet south of Hughes
Street. Tompkins had a deep gash on his right temple, and his severed
right arm was in between the tracks. Colwell told the young men to go to
Mrs. Rentford’s house down the street and call an ambulance. After
calling the ambulance, they disappeared. Colwell also yelled to his
neighbor, Aloysius Thomas McHale, who dressed and came out to help.3

* Spears-Gilbert Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky School of Law. J.D., New York
University School of Law, 2005; M.F.A., San Francisco Art Institute, 1997; B.A, University of
California, Berkeley, 1995. Thanks to Roger P. Nober and Adam Charnes for helpful suggestions.
Thanks to Enrique Guerra-Pujol, Anthony Gaughan, and Joshua A. Douglas, as well as the faculty of
the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law and the University of Mississippi School of Law for
thoughtful comments. Thanks to Amelia Landenberger, Michel Yang, Franklin Runge, William A.
Hilyard, Mark Blankenship, and Lexington Sauers for their invaluable research assistance. Thanks to
Jake Kobrick, Associate Historian at the Federal Judicial Center for information about Judge
Mandelbaum. Special thanks to Zvi S. Rosen for gathering primary source documents and making
research suggestions. And finally, thanks to Camilla Alexandra Hrdy for being the “but for” cause of
this paper, by inviting me to the University of Akron Center for Constitutional Law conference “Erie
at Eighty: Choice of Law Across the Disciplines.”
1. Elizabeth Cotten, Freight Train (c. 1906-12).
2. On July 27, 1934 at 2:30 a.m., the moon was 99.5% full.
3. Transcript of Record at 115, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1937). (No.367)
[hereinafter R.].
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Colwell and McHale stayed with Tompkins until the ambulance arrived
at about 2:45 a.m. and took him to Pittston Hospital. 4
After the accident, Tompkins regained consciousness in the hospital
receiving room. The doctors sedated him, stitched up the wound on his
face, and amputated the remainder of his right arm. He spent about three
weeks in the hospital, during which time he developed an infection in his
shoulder, which became an abscess. The doctors drained the abscess, and
the wound eventually healed, but Tompkins experienced persistent
phantom limb pain in his missing fingers. 5 His surgery cost about $350,
and his hospital stay cost about $89. 6
The train that injured Tompkins was the Ashley Special No. 2499, a
freight train operated by the Erie Railroad Company. Tompkins filed a
diversity action against Erie in federal court, because the relevant federal
common law rule on people injured by trains was more favorable to him
than the Pennsylvania rule. While Tompkins won at trial and on appeal,
the Supreme Court reversed in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins,
holding that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state substantive
law. 7
The Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins “was completely unheralded and unexpected.” 8 For almost a
century, the Court had followed its opinion in Swift v. Tyson, holding that
federal courts sitting in diversity should apply “general” common law,
which gradually became “federal” common law. 9 But after Erie, “federal
general common law” was no more. 10
Initially, lawyers were unsure what to make of Erie. But legal
scholars immediately recognized its significance, which has only become
more pronounced over time. Today, it is widely considered both one of
the most important Supreme Court decisions, and one of the most
enigmatic, in part because it touches on so many different issues. Among
other things, it implicates philosophical questions about the nature of law,
constitutional questions about federalism and the separation of powers,
4. R., supra note 3, at 86-87. See also Tompkins Loses Arm, WILKES-BARRE TIMES LEADER,
July 27, 1934, at 25.
5. R., supra note 3, at 31-32. Tompkins testified that the doctors amputated the socket. “A.
They took my arm right out of the socket. Q. You have no stub or anything? A. Or no socket; they
took the socket too.” Id. However, the doctors actually performed a “shoulder disarticulation,”
removing the entire humerus at the socket.
6. R., supra note 3, at 16.
7. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8. Robert L. Stearns, Erie Railroad Versus Tompkins: One Year After, 12 ROCKY MTN. L.
REV. 1 (1939).
9. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
10. Erie, 304 U.S. 64, 78. (“There is no federal general common law.”).
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normative questions about access to justice, and practical questions about
litigation strategy. For law professors, the Erie doctrine is the gift that
keeps on giving. But for law students it is a curse, often dubbed the “Eerie
doctrine,” presumably because it always appears when least expected.
And yet, in the judicial and scholarly retelling, the facts of the case
become almost irrelevant. Erie was a case about what law to apply, not
what happened in Hughestown on July 27, 1934. But for both Tompkins
and the Erie Railroad, it was a case about what actually happened, who
was at fault, and why.
Over the years, a smattering of journalists, lawyers, and legal
scholars have told the story of Erie, relying on the record and an
assortment of primary and secondary sources. 11 But all have accepted
Tompkins’s account at face value: An unsecured refrigerator car door hit
him while he was walking on the path next to the railroad track.
Apparently, the jury believed Tompkins, or at least voted in his favor. But
was he actually telling the truth?
Ultimately, it is impossible to know for sure. Everyone involved is
now long dead. But there are reasons to be suspicious. The defense
strategy was primarily to question the credibility of Tompkins and his
witnesses. Apparently, it failed to convince the jury. But it exposed many
curious cracks in Tompkins’s story.
According to Tompkins, he was walking home from his mother-inlaw’s house at about 2 a.m., when friends driving home from a lake resort
20 miles away happened to pass by and give him a ride to a railroad
crossing a block away from his house. While he walked the rest of the
way home on a path next to the railroad track, an oncoming train passed
at about 30 miles per hour. Something projecting from the train, probably
an unsecured refrigerator car door, struck him in the head and knocked
him unconscious. When he fell to the ground, his right arm fell under the
wheels of the train, and was severed just below his shoulder. Luckily, only

11. See, e.g., Bob Rizzi, Erie Memoirs Reveal Drama, Tragedy, 63 HARV. L. REV. 2 (1976)
(while this article is wildly inaccurate in almost every respect, it includes excerpts from Aaron L.
Danzig’s unpublished memoirs); Irving Younger, What Happened in Erie, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1011
(1978) (relying on communications with Bernard Nemeroff and others, as well as a wide range of
primary and secondary sources); Celebrating The Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins Project,
97 Luzerne Reg. Rep., Jan. 2007, https://docplayer.net/4106463-Published-weekly-by-the-wilkesbarre-law-library-association.html [https://perma.cc/LKB8-JP36] (relying on secondary sources and
local legend); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE STORY OF ERIE: HOW LITIGANTS, LAWYERS, JUDGES,
POLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE RESHAPE THE LAW, IN CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES (Kevin M.
Clermont, ed., 2nd ed. 2008) (collecting information from a wide range of primary and secondary
sources).
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minutes after he was injured, two unidentified young men just happened
to stumble upon him, alert Colwell, and then disappear without a trace.
I find Tompkins’s story implausible. And so did Erie’s lawyer, who
repeatedly asked Tompkins and his witnesses if they were serious. Of
course, it is impossible to know for sure what really happened. But I think
Tompkins and his witnesses were lying. I suspect that Tompkins was
actually trying to board the Ashley Special and ride it to Wilkes-Barre,
presumably to look for work, when he slipped and fell. The two young
men who found him were probably also trying to catch the train, or
perhaps were already riding it, and jumped off when they saw Tompkins
fall. And Tompkins’s friends simply concocted a cover story about
dropping him off at the railroad crossing, in order to substantiate his claim.
Does it matter? After all, Erie was ultimately a case about the
authority of the federal courts, not what actually happened to Tompkins.
I think it does. For one thing, knowing the truth is valuable for its
own sake. 12 But for another, knowing the truth about Erie may help us
better understand the social context in which the case was litigated and
decided.
For example, scholars have assumed that Tompkins filed his action
in the Southern District of New York in order to choose the more
favorable general common law rule. And it is certainly the case that the
general common law rule was better for him than the Pennsylvania
common law rule. But what if that was not the only reason? What if he
also chose the Southern District of New York in the hopes of getting a
more favorable jury?
Moreover, conventional wisdom casts the story of Erie v. Tompkins
as the Supreme Court sacrificing Tompkins in order to achieve the
progressive goal of overruling Swift v. Tyson. But maybe the progressive
Supreme Court justices were willing to use Erie v. Tompkins as a vehicle
in part because they knew Tompkins was lying? In any case, I offer the
following critical account of Erie v. Tompkins for your consideration.

12. As a great philosopher once said, “Now you know, and knowing is half the battle.” G.I.
JOE: A REAL AMERICAN HERO (Marvel Productions1983).
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Harry James Tompkins (c. 1930)
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Harry James Tompkins and Edith (Newhart) Tompkins (c. 1930).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 12

538

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:531

Harry James Tompkins & Naomi Tompkins (c. 1960).

II. HARRY JAMES TOMPKINS
Hughestown is a borough in the Greater Pittston area of Luzerne
County in northeastern Pennsylvania, about halfway between Scranton
and Wilkes-Barre, where the Lackawanna River joins the Susquehanna
River. In 1934, it had about 2,300 residents, many of them coal miners. 13
Harry James Tompkins was born in Hughestown on July 31, 1907,
to Emanuel Tompkins and Sarah Bowkley Tompkins. Tompkins started
13. In the 1930 Census the population of Hughestown was 2,252 and in the 1940 Census its
population was 2,340. Edward M. Harrington’s estimate of a population of about 2,800 is improbably
high. Record 107. In the 2010 Census, the population of Hughestown was 1,392, and it appears to be
declining.
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working as soon as possible, first in a knitting mill, and then at a coal
breaker, and dropped out of school at 15. 14 In 1920, he got a job at the
Pittston Stove Works, where he eventually learned the trade of iron
moulding, and joined the Iron Moulders’ Union of North America, Local

No. 133. 15
Pittston Stove Works (c. 1907)
On May 10, 1930, Tompkins married Edith Newhart of Exeter, at the
Methodist Episcopal Church in West Pittston. 16 They moved to 7 Hughes
Street in Hughestown, an “unpretentious white framehouse.” 17 And their
daughter Naomi Tompkins was born on May 14, 1931. 18 One of
Tompkins’s lawyers described him as follows: “Mild mannered, slight of

14. R., supra note 3, at 18. A “knitting mill” was a factory that produced knitted goods. A “coal
breaker” was a factory that processed anthracite coal by breaking it into pieces of various useful sizes,
sorting the pieces by size, and removing impurities. Apparently, Tompkins began working at the
knitting mill at the age of 12 or 13, possibly even younger.
15. R., supra note 3, at 18. See generally Margaret Loomis Stecker, The Founders, the
Molders, and the Molding Machine, 32 Q. J. OF ECON 278 (1918) (describing the iron moulding trade).
The Iron Moulders’ Union of North America was founded on July 5, 1859. RICHARD T. ELY, THE
LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (1886). Local No. 133 represented the moulders at the Pittston Stove
Works. It later became the International Molders and Foundry Workers Union of North America. In
1988, it merged with the Glass, Pottery, Plastics and Allied Workers International Union to form the
Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics and Allied Workers International Union, which is now part of United
Steelworkers.
16. Tompkins-Newhart, The Evening News, WILKES-BARRE, May 13, 1930, at 6.
17. Aaron L. Danzig, Erie v. Tompkins at 50: Due a Respectful Burial?, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 26,
1988, at 6 (1988).
18. Pittston Briefs, WILKES-BARRE RECORD, May 20, 1931, at 18.
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build, soft spoken, you would say of him that his whole life would be
spent in the backwaters of the commonplace.” 19
When the Depression hit in 1929, work at the Pittston Stove Works
gradually began to dry up. By 1934, Tompkins was working only three or
four days a week for about six months of the year, earning $7 to $7.50 per
day. 20 In late June 1934, the Pittston Stove Works finally closed, and
Tompkins was unemployed. He looked for odd jobs repairing stoves, with
limited success. 21 And then he had his fateful encounter with the Ashley
Special. 22

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, Situation Plan at Rock Street
19.
20.
21.
22.

Danzig, supra note 18, at 6.
R., supra note 3, at 175-77.
Id. at 19.
Hughestown Man Sues Erie for Damages, THE EVENING NEWS, Oct. 9, 1936, at 3.
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Street Plan at Rock Street (Map View) (2018)

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3
Photograph taken with camera 100 feet east from point of accident,
looking west. 23

23. The camera was located at Hughes Street and depicts the railroad tracks leading to Rock
Street. The solid line to the right of the railroad track indicates the path on which Tompkins was
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Street Plan at Rock Street (Satellite View) (2018)

Photograph of Hughes Street from Rock Street (2015)

walking. The dotted lines indicate the paths from Colwell’s gate to Rock Street and to the path next
to the railroad track. “P” indicates where Colwell found Tompkins. “V1” indicates the window
through which Colwell saw Tompkins. “V2” indicates Colwell’s gate. “V3” indicates the ditch in
front of Colwell’s picket fence.
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Photograph of Hughes Street showing remaining rail (2015)
III. THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT
Tompkins’s accident occurred about 5 or 10 feet south of the stubend of Hughes Street. Rock Street ran roughly east-west through
Hughestown. It crossed Searle Street to the west and the railroad track to
the east. Hughes Street ran parallel to Rock Street, one block to the north.
It dead-ended into Searle Street in the west, and the railroad right of way
in the east. The railroad track ran roughly north-south, curving east to the
north of Hughes Street. There was a spur just south of the Rock Street
crossing.
Colwell’s house was on the southwest corner of the intersection of
Hughes Street and the railroad track. McHale’s house was next to
Colwell’s, at the northwest corner of Rock Street and the railroad track.
Tompkins’s house was on the northern side of Hughes Street, two houses
to the west of the railroad track.
The railroad right of way on the west side of the track between Rock
Street and Hughes Street was about 29 feet wide, and ended at Colwell’s
picket fence. The right of way sloped up to the track, and the ground was
rough and rutted. A footpath on the west side of the railroad track ran from
Rock Street to Hughes Street, about 115 feet. The path was about 2 feet
from the ends of the railroad ties and about 2 feet wide. Another footpath
ran east from the end of Hughes Street, crossed the railroad track, and led
to Center Street.
The Ashley Special was an Erie Railroad freight train traveling from
Avoca Station to Ashley Station. On the morning of July 27, 1934, it was
pulling thirty-eight cars, a coal tender, and a caboose. When it reached
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Ashley Station, the cars were transferred to the Central Railroad Company
of New Jersey. 24

Avoca Station (c. 1930)

Ashley Station (c. 1940)

24.

R., supra note 3, at 181-85.
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Bernard Nemeroff (1956)
IV. BERNIE NEMEROFF & AARON DANZIG FOR THE PLAINTIFF
Nathan Nemeroff owned several shirt factories, including one in
Berwick, Pennsylvania, about 40 miles southwest of Hughestown. 25
Somehow, Nemeroff heard about Tompkins’s accident and referred him
to his son Bernie, a New York lawyer. 26
Bernard G. “Bernie” Nemeroff was a recent graduate of the New
York University School of Law, who ran a struggling practice with his
classmate, Bernard Kaufman, out of a rented office at 11 Broadway in

25. Nathan Nemeroff was born in Kiev and emigrated to the United States in 1898. He began
working in the textile industry as soon as he was able, and opened his own business in 1915. Most of
his factories were in New York City. Radio Singer, Bride of Reading Resident, READING TIMES, Jan.
17, 1936, at 10. Obituaries: Nathan Nemeroff, THE JOURNAL NEWS, Mar. 12, 1965, at 2.
26. Danzig, supra note 18, at 6 (“Bernie got the case through his father who was in the shirt
business and dealt with Pennsylvania contractors in the area.”).
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Manhattan. 27 Desperate for clients, and willing to gamble on a big payout,
Nemeroff took Tompkins’s case on contingency.

11 Broadway (1919)
When Nemeroff took Tompkins’s case, his first question was where
to file the action. In theory, he could have filed in a Pennsylvania or New
York state court. Tompkins alleged a common law tort claim for
negligence, over which both states had personal jurisdiction. 28 But filing

27. Nemeroff graduated from the NYU Law part-time division in 1929. In 1934, Nemeroff and
Kaufman were both 27. Younger, supra note 11. See also Danzig, supra note 18, at 6.
28. While Erie did not question personal jurisdiction, it operated a railroad in both New York
and Pennsylvania, so presumably it was subject to jurisdiction in personam in both states. In any case,
Erie was incorporated and headquartered in New York, and owned a great deal of property in
Pennsylvania, so at the very least it was subject to jurisdiction in personam in New York and
jurisdiction quasi in rem in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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in state court was pointless, because Erie could and most certainly would
remove the action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. 29
So, Nemeroff knew he might as well file Tompkins’s action in
federal court. But which one? While Tompkins lived in Pennsylvania,
Nemeroff was a member of the New York bar and was not licensed to
practice in Pennsylvania, so New York was obviously the most
convenient option for him.
Accordingly, on August 29, 1934, Nemeroff served the Erie Railroad
Company with a summons and complaint, initiating Tompkins’s action in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, a
few blocks up the street from his office. 30 The complaint alleged that
Tompkins was on an established footpath when Erie negligently injured
him by running its train at a dangerous speed, failing to ring the bell or
blow the whistle, and allowing an object to project from the train, which
struck Tompkins, and demanded $100,000 in damages. 31
Shortly after filing the action, Nemeroff hired Aaron L. Danzig,
Columbia law student, to help with research. 32 According to Danzig’s
recollection:
Renting an office in the same suite where I went to work was a lawyer
by the name of Bernard Nemeroff. Bernie was all of 28 but seemed 40
years older than I. A sharp dresser, keenly intelligent, with piercing blue
eyes that frequently darted about as he spoke to you. Bernie had a
practice of sorts, but was definitely not a legal scholar. One day he
approached and asked me if I would help him with a piece of litigation.
It was a case involving Harry Tompkins.

...
Bernie had brought the case in the U.S. District Court in the Southern
District of New York on grounds of diversity, after discovering that the
railroad was a New York corporation. 33

29. Tompkins was a citizen of Pennsylvania, where he lived, and Erie was a citizen of New
York, where it was incorporated and headquartered, so the parties were diverse, and the amount in
controversy far exceeded the $3,000 statutory requirement for diversity jurisdiction.
30. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York had just moved to
the City Hall Post Office and Courthouse.
31. R., supra note 3, at 2-4. By that time, Tompkins and his family had moved into his motherin-law’s house at 1125 Wyoming Avenue in Exeter.
32. Aaron Leon Danzig was 21, and was clerking for another lawyer at 11 Broadway when
Nemeroff hired him. Danzig, supra note 18, at 6. See also Younger, supra note 11. Danzig graduated
from law school in 1935, and later earned an LLM from the New York University School of Law.
Notably, Danzig had contracted polio as a child, and lost the use of one of his arms. Stuart Lavietes,
Aaron Danzig, 89, Who Argued Landmark Case on Court Power, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002.
33. Danzig, supra note 18, at 6.
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Danzig soon discovered that Nemeroff was lucky to have filed
Tompkins’s action in a New York federal court, because he had
unwittingly chosen the substantive law most favorable to Tompkins. 34 At
the time, most courts held that a person using a path parallel to a railroad
track was a licensee of the railroad, so the railroad was liable in tort for
injuries caused by its negligence. But the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
had recently held that a person using a path parallel to a railroad track was
a trespasser, so the railroad was liable in tort only for injuries caused by
“wanton negligence,” which essentially meant recklessness.35
Tompkins only alleged negligence, so if Nemeroff had filed the
action in a Pennsylvania court, it probably would have been dismissed for
failure to state a claim. And if Nemeroff had filed the action in a New
York court, it probably would have applied Pennsylvania substantive law
and dismissed as well.
But federal courts didn’t have to apply state common law rules. In
Swift v. Tyson, the Supreme Court held that federal courts sitting in
diversity should apply state statutory law and “general” common law. 36
Accordingly, under Swift, federal courts were supposed to apply the
general common law negligence rule, rather than the Pennsylvania
common law willfulness rule. In other words, while a state court probably
would have dismissed Tompkins’s action, a federal court probably would
not.
Even better, New York federal courts were more likely to apply the
favorable general common law than Pennsylvania federal courts. The
Third Circuit had recently held that Pennsylvania federal courts should
apply Pennsylvania common law to tort claims against railroads, but the
Second Circuit consistently held that federal courts should apply general
common law. 37

34. Many scholars have assumed that Nemeroff filed Tompkins’s action in the Southern
District of New York for the purpose of forum shopping, and after the fact, Nemeroff appears to have
encouraged that assumption. See Younger, supra note 11 (describing Nemeroff’s litigation strategy,
based on a conversation with Nemeroff). But Danzig’s account suggests that Nemeroff’s decision to
file in the Southern District of New York was merely fortuitous. Danzig, supra note 18, at 6.
35. Falchetti v. Penna. R.R. Co., 160 A. 859 (Pa. 1932).
36. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
37. Compare Perucca v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 35 F. 2d 113 (3rd Cir. 1929) (“The duty
of one about to cross the tracks of a railroad in the state of Pennsylvania has been frequently declared
by the courts of that state. That law governs here.”) with Tompkins v. Erie R. Co., 90 F.2d 603, 604
(2d Cir. 1937)
The defendant contends that the only duty owed to the plaintiff was to refrain from willful
or wanton injury because the courts of Pennsylvania have so ruled with respect to persons
using a customary longitudinal path, as distinguished from a path crossing the track. The
plaintiff denies that such is the local law, but we need not go into this matter since the
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In other words, Nemeroff inadvertently filed Tompkins’s action in
one of the only available venues in which it had a chance of success. In
state court or in Pennsylvania federal court, it probably would have been
dismissed for failure to state a claim or decided on summary judgment.
But in the Southern District of New York, it could survive and get to a
jury. And not just any jury, but a remarkably sympathetic one.

Theodore Kiendl (1944)
V. DAVIS POLK FOR THE DEFENDANT
The Erie Railroad Company was formed in 1832 to provide rail
service between New York City and Lake Erie, and gradually expanded
across New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, with several hiccups along the

defendant concedes that the great weight of authority in other states is to the contrary. This
concession is fatal to its contention, for upon questions of general law the federal courts
are free, in absence of a local statute, to exercise their independent judgment as to what
the law is; and it is well settled that the question of the responsibility of a railroad for
injuries caused by its servants is one of general law.
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way. 38 Erie had long retained the venerable white-shoe law firm Davis,
Polk, Wardwell, Gardiner & Reed as its legal counsel. 39 Accordingly,
when Erie received service of process from Tompkins, it naturally sent
the summons and complaint to Davis Polk. 40 Soon afterward, Davis Polk
answered the complaint, denying any liability, alleging contributory
negligence, and asking the court to dismiss the action. 41

The Equitable Trust Building, 15 Broad Street (~1930)
The court ignored Erie’s motion to dismiss, and the parties traded
discovery requests. Erie served Tompkins with a demand for a bill of
particulars describing the accident, its causes, and its effects. 42 Tompkins
responded by serving Erie with a notice of discovery, stating that on July
38. The New York and Erie Rail Road was formed in New York on April 24, 1832. It went
bankrupt in 1859, and was reorganized as the Erie Railway in 1861. The Erie Railway went bankrupt
in 1878, and was reorganized as the New York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad. In 1893, the New
York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad went bankrupt, and was reorganized as the Erie Railroad
Company in 1895.
39. The firm was founded in 1849 as Gunthrie, Bangs & Van Sinderen, but changed its name
many times to recognize new partners. In 1934, its primary office was at 15 Broad Street in
Manhattan. Today, it is known as Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, and its primary office is at 450
Lexington Avenue. Kiendl was a graduate of Columbia College and Columbia Law School. He
became a partner in 1923, and remained with the firm until he retired in 1965.
40. R., supra note 3, at 2-5.
41. Id. at 5-6.
42. Id. at 13-14.
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27, 1934, at about 2:30 am, he was walking home on the path next to the
railroad track when an Erie train approached him at a “terrific” rate of
speed. 43 As the train passed, “some projection” from the third or fourth
car hit Tompkins in the head and knocked him to the ground, causing the
wheels of the train to sever his right arm. 44 Tompkins observed that under
the circumstances, he could not specifically identify Erie’s negligent acts,
noting that “there were no other pedestrians or persons at the scene of the
accident at the time of its occurrence” so he “has no witnesses nor witness
who saw the accident.” 45 Tompkins’s statement was followed by a series
of interrogatories, seeking information about the train and Erie’s
investigation of the accident. 46
Davis Polk assigned the action to Theodore Kiendl, its primary trial
lawyer. 47 Among other things, Kiendl asked S. Hazard Gillespie, a
summer law clerk from Yale Law School, to determine whether the
application of Pennsylvania law would benefit Erie, and Gillespie
responded that it would. 48
On February 14, 1935, the lawyers for both sides deposed seventeen
witnesses in Pittstown.49 On April 29, 1936, Nemeroff filed a bill of
particulars. 50 And then the action proceeded to trial.
VI. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT
In the 1930s, the New York bar was still sharply divided by both
geography and ethnicity. The elite WASP firms were “downtown,”
clustered around Wall Street, and the Jewish and Irish firms were
“uptown,” which meant anything north of Cedar Street. The elite firms
hired few Jews, and gave them even fewer opportunities for promotion.

43. Id. at 7-16.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Kiendl was a graduate of Columbia College and Columbia Law School. He became a
partner in 1923, and remained with the firm until he retired in 1965.
48. Younger, supra note 11, at 1017 (citing Letter from S. Hazard Gillespie to Irving Younger,
Jan. 23, 1978). Younger placed the letter on file with the Texas Law Review, but it was discarded.
Gillespie later became the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, the President
of the New York State Bar Association, and a senior partner in Davis Polk.
49. R., supra note 3, at 91. The witnesses deposed in Pennsylvania were Henry Brodbeck, Jr.;
Walter Perschau; Samuel Carr; Joseph Guerin; Thomas Hefferon; Albert Dotter; John J. Reilly;
George Trewein; Frank T. Keller; Benjamin Renfer; Ernest Cook; Charles Fritz; Elmer Smith; Louis
Weitz; William Colwell; and Fred Jennings. To Take Depositions in Big Damage Suit, PITTSTON
GAZETTE, Jan. 24, 1935, at 5. Some of these witnesses testified at trial, but most did not.
50. R., supra note 3, at 15-16.
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And the elite bar was openly and unapologetically anti-Semitic. Jewish
lawyers started their own firms, because they had no other choice.51
Davis Polk was among the most exclusive of the elite firms. It
represented Wall Street and the titans of industry, and hired no Jews.
Nemeroff, Kaufman, and Danzig were the epitome of striving Jewish
lawyers, with a rented office on the periphery of prestige, struggling to
find clients.

Judge Samuel Mandelbaum (1934)
A.

Judge Mandelbaum

When Tompkins’s action was ready for trial, it was assigned to the
newly-appointed Judge Samuel Mandelbaum. Mandelbaum was born in
Poland in about 1884. 52 His family emigrated to the United States in 1890,
and he grew up in a tenement on the Lower East Side. As a child, he
contracted polio, which crippled his legs. 53 Nevertheless, he got involved
51. MILTON S. GOULD, THE WITNESS WHO SPOKE WITH GOD, AND OTHER TALES FROM THE
COURTHOUSE ix-xx (1975).
52. Mandelbaum’s naturalization papers stated that he was born on September 23, 1883. But
his New York State Bar membership stated that he was born on September 20, 1884. And the
Martindale-Hubble legal directory stated that he was born in 1885. FBI Rep. (February 13, 1939).
53. According to the FBI,
Judge Mandelbaum’s health is generally satisfactory except for a slight impairment, the
result of an accident some years ago when he was struck by lightning, and while not
physically incapacitated, as a result of the accident he finds it more conducive to his
comfort to ride to court each morning in his privately owned automobile rather than make
the trip by ordinary city transit facilities.
Id.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss2/12

22

Frye: The Ballad of Harry James Tompkins

2018]

THE BALLAD OF HARRY JAMES TOMPKINS

553

in politics at an early age, graduated from the New York University
School of Law, practiced law for about a decade, and then ran for public
office. 54 He served as a member of the New York State Assembly from
1923 to 1932, where he became an advisor to Governor Franklin D.
Roosevelt, and as a member of the New York State Senate from 1933 to
1936. 55
On June 15, 1936, President Roosevelt nominated Mandelbaum to a
new seat on the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. 56 The American Bar Association, the New York County
Lawyers’ Association, and the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York all opposed the nomination, arguing that Mandelbaum was
unqualified, because he had never even tried a case in federal court. 57 The
Southern District was the most prestigious court in the country, and they
were appalled to see a ghetto Jew nominated for a seat.
In fairness, Mandelbaum’s qualifications for the job were
questionable. But he had overwhelming political and popular support, and
was confirmed on June 20, 1936. 58 As Roosevelt observed: “There was
one other man I considered for the job. He was equally qualified, but
unlike Mandelbaum, he had never lived in a tenement. All other things
being equal, I think the man who had lived in a tenement is better suited
54. Mandelbaum earned an LL.B. in 1912 and an LL.M. in 1913. “His marks, however, were
barely passing.” Id.
55. Mandelbaum was a member of Roosevelt’s “Turkey Cabinet,” a group of political advisors
that convened most Mondays at the Executive Mansion for a turkey lunch. He became close friends
with Eleanor Roosevelt, who ensured that he received kosher turkey on kosher dishes, and
accompanied him on tours of the Lower East Side slums. When Roosevelt was elected President,
Mandelbaum frequently visited him at the White House. Gould, supra note 52.
56. Congress had recently created three new seats on the court. 49 Stat. 1491.
57. The New York City Bar objected to both Mandelbaum and Clancy, one of Roosevelt’s
other nominees, observing that they were not,
[A]ctive practitioners in the Federal Court and we know of no reason for their nominations
other than political consideration. . . . They do not possess the essential qualifications for
this high office and are not equipped with the specialized knowledge and experience that
present day administration of justice requires.
Bar Opposes Two Nominees, MIDDLETOWN TIMES HERALD, June 19, 1936, at 18.
According to the FBI,
The canvass of members of the District Court Bench, both for the Southern and Eastern
District made prior to Judge Mandelbaum’s appointment as Judge, failed to develop any
knowledge on the part of any of those interviewed with Judge Mandebaum’s earlier active
participation in Federal practice, and the investigation further indicated that Judge
Mandelbaum’s prior activities have been more along legislative lines than the regular
practice of law.
FBI Rep., supra note 55.
58. Milton S. Gould, The Alien Corn in the Southern District: A Memory of Judge Sam
Mandelbaum, Legend of Foley Square (Parts 1 and 2), N.Y.L.J., Aug, 1, 1977, at 1, and Aug. 2, 1977,
at 1. See also Gould, supra note 52.
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for a judgeship for he will have a better understanding of human
problems.” 59
Mandelbaum was sworn in on July 10, and presided over criminal
cases for ten weeks before moving to the civil docket. Tompkins v. Erie
Railroad Company was his first civil case.
B.

The Trial

The trial in Tompkins v. Erie began on October 5, 1936. Tompkins
was represented by G. Everett “Stub” or “Stubby” Hunt, who Nemeroff
hired as trial counsel. 60 Erie was represented by Kiendl. 61 Danzig
described the beginning of the trial as follows:
The fallen leaves that lay upon the steps of the U.S. Court House were
tokens of the season. It was October of 1936 and the trial was on. I sat
next to Harry in the courtroom, impressed by the grandeur, the heavy
green drapes, the dignity, and the suffocating silence, but, like him,
nervously awaiting the arrival of the judge, who we had been informed
was Samuel Mandelbaum. I had prepared an exhaustive trial
memorandum which had been handed up to the judge’s clerk.
Like Franklin D. Roosevelt who had appointed him, Judge Mandelbaum
had suffered from polio and walked with a pronounced limp. His diction
reflected his beginnings on the Lower East Side of New York City.
Unprepossessing, baldish, he did not present the image of a federal
judge. The truth is that this was the first civil case he had ever tried,
since he had been recently appointed and prior to that having served in
the state legislature. 62

C.

Tompkins’s Story

According to Tompkins, on Thursday, July 26, 1934, he ate supper
at home in Hughestown with his wife and three-year-old daughter at about
5:00 p.m. At about 6:00 p.m., he walked to visit his sick mother-in-law
Alice Newhart at her home in Exeter, about 5 or 6 miles away, across the
Susquehanna River. 63 At about 8:00 p.m., he walked down to the river to

59. THE MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Nov. 29, 1946, at 4.
60. Hunt was assisted by his associate, William G. Walsh.
61. Kiendl was assisted by Harold W. Bissell, L. Ray Glass, and S. Hazard Gillespie.
62. Danzig, supra note 18, at 6.
63. R., supra note 3, at 57. Tompkins lived at 7 Hughes Street in Hughestown and Alice
Newhart lived at 31 Memorial Street in Exeter. The walking distance between the two is actually
about 2.2 miles.
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watch people fish, then returned to Newhart’s home. And at about 12:30
or 1:00 a.m. he began walking home to Hughestown. 64

Tompkins took the “main road” through Exeter, and used the Fort
Jenkins Bridge to cross the river. 65 At about 1:30 a.m., while Tompkins
was crossing the bridge, a car passed him, then stopped, and his friend
Wilbert Schultz called out, “Come on, Harry, we will give you a ride
up.” 66 The driver of the car was Edward M. Harrington, Jr., the former
Chief of Police of Hughestown. 67 Schultz was a member of the Iron
Moulders’ Union who had worked with Tompkins at the Pittston Stove
Works. 68 Harrington and Schultz were driving home from Harvey’s Lake,

64. Id. at 27-29, 57-59. Alice Newhart lived at 31 Memorial Street in Exeter, which is actually
about 2.5 miles from 7 Hughes Street. Mrs. Alice Newhart Dies in Exeter, PITTSTON GAZETTE, Dec.
1, 1938, at 7.
65. Presumably Wyoming Avenue, which leads directly to the Fort Jenkins Bridge.
66. R., supra note 3, at 29.
67. Harrington was appointed Chief of Police on January 4, 1932. Hughestown Council Makes
Clean Sweep, THE WILKES-BARRE RECORD, January 5, 1932, at 17. He lost the position on March
28, 1933. Changes Made in Personnel in Hughestown, THE EVENING NEWS, March 29, 1933, at 7.
He was reappointed on April 15, 1933. Eight Borough Employees Lose Their Positions, WILKESBARRE TIMES LEADER, April 17, 1933, at 18. But he lost the job to Steve Moss sometime in early
1934. “Round-Up” Nets Fifty, WILKES-BARRE RECORD, Feb. 17, 1934, at 12.
68. WILKES-BARRE TIMES LEADER, Aug. 12, 1946, at 13.
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which is about 20 miles east of Hughestown. 69 They both lived near
Tompkins and offered to give him a ride home. 70

Harvey’s Lake, Pennsylvania (c. 1930-45)
At about 2:00 a.m., Harrington and Schultz dropped Tompkins on
the east side of the Rock Street crossing. Tompkins crossed back over the
railroad track and began walking north on the footpath toward Hughes
Street. When he got about halfway to Hughes Street, he heard the whistle
of a southbound train, and then saw the train’s headlight approaching, but
he continued walking north on the path. 71 Tompkins was “about four or
five steps” away from Hughes Street when the engine passed him on his
right at about 30 or 35 miles per hour. 72
The accident occurred a moment later. “When I got right on the path
there was something came up in front of me, a black object that looked
like a door to me, and I went to put my hands up and I guess before I got
them up I was hit.” 73 The object projecting from the side of the train was
about 2 or 2½ feet wide, and it hit Tompkins on his right temple, knocking
69. R., supra note 3, at 71. Harvey’s Lake is one of the largest lakes in Pennsylvania. In the
1930s, it was a popular summer resort, featuring hotels, cottages, boathouses, a casino, and an
amusement park.
70. Harrington lived at 1 Kenley Street and Schultz lived at 235 Rock Street. Miss Ann
Mattison and Wilbert Schultz Were Wedded Today, PITTSTON GAZETTE, Aug. 29, 1936, at 1. Local
Gleanings, PITTSTON GAZETTE, June 6, 1938, at 3. R., supra note 3, at 152.
71. R., supra note 3, at 47-48.
72. Id. at 71.
73. Id. at 65.
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him unconscious. 74 He fell to the ground, and the wheels of the train
severed his right arm.
D.

Erie’s Response

Unsurprisingly, Kiendl’s strategy was to discredit Tompkins’s story.
He focused on three issues: 1) the use of the footpath; 2) the speed of the
train; and 3) the inspection of the doors. Kiendl’s goal was to show that
people did leave the footpath, especially when a train was passing, that
the Ashley Special was moving relatively slowly, and that there was no
evidence of an unsecured refrigerator car door.
E.

The Footpath

Tompkins claimed that he continued walking on the footpath next to
the railroad track while the train was passing. Kiendl questioned the
credibility of that claim:
Q. Well then, if I get your testimony correctly, Mr. Tompkins, you were
walking along within two feet of the side of this moving train that was
going past you at the rate of 30 miles per hour, and you kept right on
walking alongside of it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Without any fear that anything was going to hit you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Without any fear that any coal or something else might have fallen
from that train and hit you; that is right?
A. I do not think there was any coal on that train.
Q. Well, you did not know when you saw the train coming what it had
on, did you?
A. No, sir.
Q. And did it occur to you that there might have been coal on that train?
A. No, sir.
Q. That might fall off and hit you?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did it occur to you that there might be anything else on the train that
might fall off and hit you?
A. No, sir.
Q. You felt perfectly safe in your own mind as you walked along there
within a foot or two of a 30 mile moving train, to continue along, and it
never occurred to you at any time to get further away to a place of safety?
A. No, sir. 75
74.
75.
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Tompkins’s witnesses made the same claim, eliciting the same
reaction from Kiendl. For example, witness McHale insisted that people
walked on the footpath while trains were passing a foot or two away, day
and night, and that it was perfectly safe to do so.
Q. Have you ever seen anybody walking along that path at night in the
pitch dark when a train was going by?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many times have you seen people doing that, Mr. McHale?
A. I have seen them hundreds of times.
Q. Hundreds of times at night?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In the pitch dark?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Walking along that path?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you have walked along it yourself at night?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you were walking along it, when you got to the point that
we are interested in A. Yes, sir.
Q. (Continuing.) - where these two paths converge A. Yes, sir.
Q. - alongside of the ties; you have done that often, haven’t you?
A. I have walked it; yes, sir.
Q. How close was your body to the moving side of the train when you
did that?
A. Oh, I would say a foot or two feet away.
Q. A foot or two feet away?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you tell this Court and Jury that you have walked alongside of a
moving train?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. At night?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. With the side of that moving train within a foot of your body?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you have seen other people do that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the trains go by there pretty fast, wouldn’t they?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Sometimes, twenty miles an hour, thirty miles an hour, forty miles an
hour?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you have done that frequently?
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A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you think that was dangerous?
A. No, sir. 76
...
Q. Do you tell this Court and jury that you feel perfectly safe walking at
night on this path with a train moving up to forty miles an hour?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Passing you within one foot of the side of your body?
A. Yes, sir. 77

Schultz made the same claim, albeit somewhat more reluctantly, as
if he recognized the absurdity of what he was saying:
Q. Now, when you used the path on the twenty times when you used it,
if it were twenty times, did you did you walk along that path along the
edge of these railroad ties when trains were coming?
A. Yes.
Q. You have?
A. Yes.
Q. When trains were coming from either direction?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you had been in this stove company business all of your life; you
had never been in the railroad business, had you?
A. No, sir.
Q. And the trains come awfully close to you when you were walking
along that path?
A. Oh, maybe a foot and a half away.
Q. Maybe a foot and a half?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the trains would move at a fairly rapid rate of speed?
A. Fairly good rate of speed.
Q. And they would come from behind you and in front of you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You did not consider that dangerous at all, did you?
A. Not if the train was in good condition and nothing sticking out from
it, no.
Q. Well did you expect things might be sticking out from trains
sometimes?
A. No.
Q. It never occurred to you that things might be sticking out from trains,
such as machinery or something of that kind?
76.
77.
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A. Sir?
Q. It never occurred to you, did it?
A. Never could, did you say?
Q. You never thought about anything projecting from the side of the
train?
A. No.
Q. You never thought about any wide cars containing automobiles or
furniture?
A. No, sir.
Q. Or anything of that kind?
A. No, sir.
Q. You considered it perfectly safe in the daytime to walk along that
path with trains moving at a rapid rate of speed within a foot and a half
of you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you consider it safe for you to do that at nighttime?
A. I didn’t do it at nighttime.
Q. In complete darkness?
A. I did not do it at nighttime.
Q. Would you consider it safe to do it at nighttime in complete darkness?
Mr. Hunt: Objected to.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Hunt: Exception.
Q. Would you?
A. No, sir.
Q. In your experience in using that path, as one of the citizens of that
borough for thirty-nine years, I understand you to tell this Court and Jury
that, having seen the path and having seen people walking on it, you
would consider it dangerous to walk on that path in pitch darkness?
A. I would not.
Q. When trains were coming toward you?
A. I would not consider it dangerous.
Q. You would consider it perfectly safe?
A. Yes. 78

Additionally, Tompkins and his witnesses claimed that people
walked on the footpath and only on the footpath. Indeed, they insisted that
no one ever walked anywhere in the right of way, except on the footpath.
Tompkins stated that he had never seen anyone set foot in the right of way,
outside of a footpath:
Q. 12 or 14 years you lived in that neighborhood?
A. Yes, sir.

78.

Id. at 147-49.
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Q. And during all that time you were within two blocks of the Rock
Street Crossing of the railroad company, weren’t you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And during those 12 or 14 years that you have seen anybody walking
in that territory they were walking on the path that goes up to Hughes
Street or they were walking on the Hughes Street path that came up to
the track, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now I will ask you again, Mr. Tompkins, do you mean that seriously?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What?
A. Yes, sir. 79

Likewise, Colwell stated that he had never seen anyone set foot in
the right of way, outside of a footpath:
Q. Now, take that piece of land, Mr. Colwell, it is about 115 feet long
and about 35 feet wide between Hughes Street, Rock Street, the railroad
ties and the fence. In the two years that you have lived at the house that
you have indicated on the map had you ever seen anybody at any time
walk in any part of that territory except on the two paths that you have
told us about?
A. No, sir.
Q. Never once?
A. No, sir. That is too rough walking.
Q. Let us see Mr. Colwell; see that I get this straight. You have never
seen a soul A. No, sir.
Q. (Continuing.) - walking over any other part of that whole territory?
A. No, sir.
Q. Except the path along the ties and the path to Hughes Street?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you mean that?
A. I sure do.
Q. You understand that you have told Mr. Hunt here - I thought you did
- that you walked out of your gate across part of that territory?
A. Well, that path I do. 80

Indeed, Colwell even claimed that it would have been impossible for
anyone to walk in the right of way, except on the path:
Q. Did you ever see anybody walk alongside of your fence?

79.
80.
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A. No, sir.
Q. Is there any reason why you could not walk alongside of your fence
if you wanted to?
A. Well, you could walk alongside of it, but you would roll down and
under.
Q. You would roll in under the fence?
A. Exactly.
Q. You don’t mean that, do you?
A. I sure do. Here is the ditch right here (indicating), see, and down here
there is a bank goes right under the fence.
Q. Now, you asked me if I saw the ditch?
A. Yes.
Q. There are some rocks right up against the fence, aren’t there?
A. Yes.
Q. And a drain that runs in there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But come out two feet from the fence. There is no reason why you
couldn’t walk in there, is there?
A. It is pretty rough there.
Q. It is like it is shown in this picture?
A. No, sir; it is rougher than that.
Q. Do you mean that the territory we are talking about is not correctly
shown in this picture, Mr. Colwell?
A. It is not, no, sir. 81

In all of these exchanges, Kiendl’s incredulity is palpable. And for
good reason, because the claims are ridiculous. It is simply not credible
that people walked on the path while trains were passing a foot or two
away. Surely, people stepped off the path when trains were passing.
Indeed, it is more likely that people simply did not use the path at all when
trains were passing. The railroad track in question was only rarely used,
primarily late at night by the Ashley Special. Most of the time, the path
was perfectly safe, simply because no trains were present.
Unsurprisingly, William H. Henning, the engineer who was
operating the Ashley Special when it hit Tompkins, testified that he had
seen people walking on the footpath next to the railroad track between
Rock Street and Hughes Street, and that when a train passed them, they
always stepped out of the way. 82 Notably, Henning also testified that he
did not see anyone on the path on July 27, 1934, when Tompkins was
injured. 83
81.
82.
83.

Kiendl and Colwell are referring to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3. Id. at 425.
Id. at 325-26.
R., supra note 3, at 325-26.
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The Speed of the Train

Tompkins claimed that the Ashley Special was going about 30 or 35
miles per hour when it hit him. 84 And Tompkins’s witnesses claimed that
it regularly went 30 to 40 miles per hour at the Rock Street crossing.
Specifically, Colwell insisted that the Ashley Special often went through
the Rock Street crossing at 30 or 40 miles per hour, and that he had
complained about it to Gannon. 85
Q. You have told us that you have told Mr. Gannon that the trains were
going too fast because of the rails?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that right?
A. Yes, sir. And that is right on a curve and our house is right there at
that curve, and I would hate to have them come through that at night.
Q. You would hate to have them go through your house at night?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you being serious, sir?
A. Well, no Q. Are you being serious?
A. Well, certainly I would hate to have that engine jump the road and go
through our house.
Q. Has the engine ever jumped the road down there?
A. No, but there is always a first time. 86

Kiendl effectively discredited those claims, by showing that the
Ashley Special was actually going about 8 to 10 miles per hour, and that
it would have been impossible for it to go any faster. When the Ashley
Special left Avoca and approached the Rock Street crossing, it was going
uphill and around a curve. As the Ashley Special’s flagman James A.
Dooner observed, “The pull was too great for the size engine we had. That
engine couldn’t make over eight to ten miles an hour with the train.” 87
Likewise, Henning testified that the Ashley Special was going about 8 or
10 miles per hour when it approached the Rock Street crossing on July 27,
1934. 88 This is consistent with the fact that it took about an hour and a half
for the Ashley Special to go about 16 miles from Avoca to Ashley. 89

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
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Swift Refrigerator Car, East Orange, New Jersey (1937).
G.

Inspection of the Refrigerator Car Door

According to Tompkins, the object that hit him was probably an
unsecured refrigerator car door. Trains pulled many different kinds of
cars, including boxcars and refrigerator cars. The doors on a boxcar slide
on a rail, but the doors of a refrigerator car swing open and closed.
Tompkins claimed that Erie had failed to secure the doors of a refrigerator
car, and that an unsecured door hit him in the head as the Ashley Special
passed him.
Hunt focused on showing that it was possible a refrigerator car door
had been open. Of course, it is always hard to prove a negative, but the
evidence suggests otherwise.
On July 27, 1934, the Ashley Special was pulling three refrigerator
cars. Specifically, the 14th, 21st, and 30th cars after the engine and coal
tender were refrigerator cars. 90 Albert Howell inspected the Ashley
Special before it left Avoca and found no defects. 91 Michael Bernard
McGrath inspected the Ashley Special when it arrived at Ashley at 4:50
a.m. and marked all of its refrigerator car doors closed and sealed. But he
acknowledged that his testimony was based entirely on his seal record
book, and that he had no direct recollection of checking the train that

90.
91.

Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 257.
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night. 92 Alfred Alworth and Steve Prabola, car inspectors for the Central
Railroad Company of New Jersey, inspected the Ashley Special shortly
after its arrival in the Ashley yard on the morning of the accident, and
found nothing significant out of the ordinary. 93 And at about 11 a.m.,
Victor H. Deppi, the car inspector foreman for the Central Railroad
Company of New Jersey in Penobscot, Pennsylvania, was informed that
there had been an injury and inspected the cars arriving from Ashley. He
found bloodstains on the flanges of the wheels of seven cars, but did not
find any open doors. 94
H.

The Verdict

When Hunt finished presenting Tompkins’s case, Kiendl made a
motion to dismiss the action, on the ground that Tompkins had failed to
prove negligence, and had in fact shown contributory negligence.
Mandelbaum denied the motion. 95 And when Kiendl finished presenting
Erie’s case, he made another motion to dismiss, which Mandelbaum also
denied. 96
On October 13, 1936, Kiendl and Hunt gave closing arguments, and
the court charged the jury. Essentially, the court told the jury that its job
was to determine whether Erie had failed to secure a refrigerator car
door. 97
The jury retired at 12:40 p.m., and returned at 4:45 p.m. with a
verdict for Tompkins, awarding him $30,000, plus interest and costs. 98
Tompkins and his lawyers were thrilled, both by the win and by the
enormous recovery. 99 As Danzig recalled, “Mr. Tompkins had been put
up at a cheap hotel, and at the celebration that evening in his room, I
remember thinking, the practice of law is really simple as long as you’re
well prepared.” 100
Kiendl moved to set aside the verdict, but on November 9, 1936,
Mandelbaum denied the motion. Accordingly, on November 16, 1936, the

92. Id. at 179-90.
93. Id. at 241.
94. Id. at 249-55.
95. R., supra note 3, at 178.
96. Id. at 339-40.
97. Id. at 343-49.
98. Id. at 351.
99. The inflation adjusted value of $30,000 in 1936 is about $500,000 in 2018. See Measuring
Worth
is
a
Complicated
Question,
https://www.measuringworth.com/index.php
[https://perma.cc/G9TM-JX2R]
100. Danzig, supra note 18, at 6.
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clerk entered judgment for Tompkins in the amount of $30,260. 101 Erie
immediately petitioned the district court for an order allowing an appeal,
which Judge John C. Knox granted on December 15, 1936. Knox also
ordered the clerk of the district court to prepare a transcript of the record,
proceedings, and judgment for the circuit court. As required by statute,
Erie paid for the printing of twenty-five copies of the record, and filed one
for certification with the clerk of the circuit court on January 14, 1937. 102
I.

The Second Circuit

Erie appealed, primarily on the ground that the district court should
have granted its motion for summary judgment. 103 Essentially, Erie
argued that the district court should have applied the Pennsylvania
common law rule and ruled in its favor as a matter of law. Erie was
represented on appeal by Theodore Kiendl, Harold W. Bissell, and L. Ray
Glass. 104 And Tompkins was represented by Bernard G. Nemeroff, G.
Everett Hunt, and William G. Walsh. 105

Judge Manton

Judge Swan

Judge Hand

The Second Circuit panel consisted of Manton, Swan, and Hand,
three of the most distinguished judges in the United States. 106 On June 7,
101. The judgment included $165 in interest and $95 in costs.
102. 36 Stat. at L. 901, chap. 47, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. (1911).
103. Erie, 90 F.2d.
104. Id. Presumably, Kiendl made the oral argument.
105. Id. Presumably, Hunt made the oral argument.
106. Thomas Walter Swan (December 20, 1877 to July 13, 1975) was Dean of Yale Law School
from 1916 to 1927 and served on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from
1926 until his death in 1975, taking senior status in 1953. Martin Thomas Manton (August 2, 1880 to
November 17, 1946) was appointed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York in 1916, becoming the youngest federal judge in the United States, and was appointed to
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1937, the Second Circuit issued a unanimous opinion affirming the district
court, albeit not without throwing some shade. According to the panel, the
only question was whether Tompkins was contributorily negligent for
failing to step aside while the train passed:
Plaintiff’s testimony that the black object which struck him looked like
a swinging door was sufficient to take to the jury the question whether
he was injured in the manner alleged and whether the defendant was
negligent in allowing a door to swing, despite the defendant’s testimony
that an inspection at Ashley showed all car doors to be closed and sealed.
The main contention of the appellant is that the plaintiff’s conduct in
walking so close to a moving train in the dark constituted contributory
negligence as a matter of law. Much testimony was directed to the
character of the ground lying between the longitudinal path and the
fence, the plaintiff endeavoring to prove that he could not safely have
walked outside the beaten path, and the defendant that he could.
Witnesses testified that no one ever walked outside the path because the
ground slanted away toward the fence and there were ruts in it; but the
fact that trucks and automobiles of all sorts were accustomed to pass
along the right of way from Rock street to Hughes street proves
conclusively that the ground was traversable outside the beaten path, and
the photographs show that at the worst it is only a little rough at the spot
where Tompkins was struck. The contention that he could not have
stepped aside while the train was passing is patently absurd. So the
question is reduced to whether he was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law in not avoiding all danger by the simple expedient of
stepping to one side. On this issue we must take the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff and must assume that the train was
moving at a speed of only 8 or 10 miles an hour, as the train crew
testified.

While the panel affirmed the jury’s verdict, it strongly signaled its
skepticism of the impartiality of that verdict, as well as jury verdicts in
similar cases:
To us it would seem imprudent to walk, or even to stand, in the dark
within a foot of a train moving at the rate of 10 miles an hour; but the
fact that recoveries have been allowed under closely similar
circumstances in the cases above cited indicates that fair-minded men

the United States Circuit Court for the Second Circuit in 1918. He resigned in 1939, in order to avoid
impeachment, and was convicted of bribery. Billings Learned Hand (January 27, 1872 to August 18,
1961) was appointed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in
1909, and was appointed to the United States Circuit Court for the Second Circuit in 1924, where he
served until his death in 1961.
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may hold a different view. This is enough to preclude taking the issue
from the jury. 107

Apparently, Hand and Swan found Tompkins’s reliance on Swift v. Tyson
a bit of a stretch, but applied it anyway:
During and after the argument of the appeal, the two judges discussed at
length the advisability of extending the Swift doctrine in yet another
opinion. They were sensitive to the sort of criticism raised against the
federal judiciary following the decision in the taxicab case, which
continued to cast a shadow eight years afters [sic] its decision. Hand and
Swan appreciated the flexibility that the Swift doctrine gave federal
judges, especially where state law was obscure or (to their minds) unfair;
but they were also concerned about potential abuse arising from an
unwise use of discretionary authority. Finally, the judges agreed to apply
the well-established doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, and decided the case
accordingly.” 108

When the Second Circuit denied Erie’s appeal, Tompkins’s lawyers
assumed that was it. Erie had to pay the judgment, unless the Supreme
Court issued a stay, and there was no reason for the Court to take the case.
So when they received a copy of Erie’s petition for a writ of certiorari,
they weren’t worried. As Danzig observed:
Now we really celebrated, this time in Bernie’s office - champagne,
smoked salmon, corned beef sandwiches, the works. The case was over.
There wasn’t a chance in the world that the Supreme Court would grant
certiorari in a case involving an accident in a small hamlet in
Pennsylvania.
So we laughed when we got the petition for certiorari. Even if they won,
they would lose. Mr. Tompkins could take his money, go to Tahiti, and
how would the railroad ever get it back? They realized that, too, and
made an application for a stay. 109

J.

Supreme Court Stay

The Court was already in summer recess, so a stay had to be issued
personally by one of the justices. Kiendl arranged for an appointment to
meet with Justice Cardozo in July at his summer home in Mamaroneck,

107.
108.

Erie, 90 F.2d at 605.
TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 128-29 (1981) (summarizing July 11, 1978 interview with W. Graham Claytor, Jr., law
clerk to Judge Learned Hand in 1937 and Justice Brandeis in 1938).
109. Danzig, supra note 18.
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New York. At the meeting, Kiendl represented Erie, and Tompkins was
represented by Nemeroff, Danzig, and Hunt’s partner Fred Rees. 110
According to Nemeroff:
The Justice walked down the steps to greet them wearing beige trousers,
a black velvet coat, and black bedroom slippers. His left hand was in the
pocket of his jacket; in his right hand he carried a white handkerchief.
Rees had told Nemeroff and Danzig that the application would be denied
because the Supreme Court had not taken a negligence case for years
and the standard for determining a motion for a stay was whether the
deciding Justice thought the full Court was likely to grant certiorari.
Kiendl spoke. He made the arguments he had made in the lower courts
and remarked also that if the stay were denied, Erie would not pursue its
petition for certiorari. No stay, no case in the Supreme Court. 111

As Danzig recalled:
The Court was in summer vacation, so it was to be heard by Justice
Cardozo in his home in Mamaroneck, N.Y. Since I had written both
briefs, Bernie asked me to argue it.
Justice Cardozo lived in a lovely old Victorian house. A summer wind
gently swayed the curtains as we waited downstairs. He entered the
room in a black velvet jacket, white handkerchief in hand, wispy grey
hair, the satiny skin on his long face bespeaking his age and ill health.
Mr. Kiendl began. His argument was the same he had used in the two
courts below. Acknowledging that Swift v. Tyson was good law, he
argued that it didn’t apply here because a local custom (a recognized
exception to Swift), applied, and then he said, “Your Honor, I must be
honest and say that if a stay is not granted, we will carry the case no
further.” Now I knew we had won. I had lined up cases in 24 states in
our favor, and I sent out this imposing legal infantry in my short
statement. The judge paused for a moment. Then he turned to me and
said, “Mr. Danzig, the law may well be what you say it is, and I don’t
doubt it, but if I don’t grant the stay it will end the case, and I think the
Court as a whole ought to have the opportunity to rule on the petition.

110. Hunt died of pneumonia on April 1, 1937. Law Graduate Dies of Pneumonia, THE ITHACA
JOURNAL, April 3, 1937, at 4.
111. Younger, supra note 11, at 1023 (paraphrasing a February 21, 1978 letter from Bernard G.
Nemeroff to Irving Younger).
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Despair. Compounded with astonishment, when a few months later the
High Court granted certiorari. 112

Cardozo probably knew that he was preserving a case that would enable
the Court to overrule Swift v. Tyson. While he had a heart attack in late
1937, and did not return for the January 1938 sitting, “Cardozo was deeply
interested in the Tompkins decision, and happy that he had had something
to do with the case earlier.” 113 Sadly, Cardozo had a stroke in early 1938,
and died on July 9, 1938, about three months after Erie was decided.
K.

The Grant of Certiorari

Erie filed its petition for certiorari on August 30, 1937. Neither party
thought the Supreme Court would grant the petition. As Rees observed,
the Court had not taken a negligence case for a long time, and there was
nothing special about Erie v. Tompkins. 114 Even the Supreme Court clerks
who reviewed the petition dismissed it as unremarkable. Brandeis clerk
William Claytor characterized Erie v. Tompkins as “just another” diversity
case, and a Hughes clerk expressed a similar opinion. 115
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Erie v.
Tompkins on October 11, 1937.
L.

The Rise and Demise of Swift v. Tyson

Presumably, Cardozo granted Erie’s request for a stay primarily
because he and other members of the Court wanted to overrule Swift v.
Tyson, and Erie v. Tompkins looked like a promising vehicle. And
presumably the Court granted certiorari in Erie v. Tompkins primarily
because the justices who wanted to overrule Swift v. Tyson thought they
had a majority.
The Court decided Swift v. Tyson in 1842, essentially holding that
federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state statutory law and
“general” common law. 116 Specifically, the Court interpreted the Rules of
Decision Act, which provided that federal courts sitting in diversity
should apply “the laws of the several states” unless preempted by federal
112. Danzig, supra note 18. In an unpublished draft memoir, Danzig recalled making a
“beautiful statement of our argument and the few points that defendant’s counsel made were easily
overcome. It was a cinch.” Rizzi, supra note 11.
113. MELVIN I. UROFSKY & DAVID W. LEVY, HALF BROTHER, HALF SON: THE LETTERS OF
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS TO FELIX FRANKFURTER 617 (1991) (quoting Judge Irving Lehman).
114. FREYER, supra note 111.
115. Id. (summarizing July 11, 1978 interview with William Graham Claytor, Jr.).
116. Swift, 41 U.S..
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law. It concluded that the Act required federal courts to apply “strictly
local” state laws, including state constitutions, state statutes, and “longestablished local customs having the force of law,” but allowed them to
apply “general” commercial law, irrespective of state practice.117
The application of “general” commercial law authorized by Swift v.
Tyson eventually led to the application of “general” common law. 118 In
other words, a decision intended to promote a uniform commercial law
developed into a principle intended to promote a uniform common law. 119
But it did not work. States stuck to their own common law rules.
Even worse, the “general” common law of the federal courts became
associated with corporate self-interest, especially as the Supreme Court
became seen as a conservative bulwark against progressive legislation.
The political legitimacy of the Court was at stake, and Swift v. Tyson was
not helping.
While the long pedigree of Swift v. Tyson was hard to challenge,
justices gradually began to defect. The crack in the dyke was Justice Field,
who rejected Swift v. Tyson in his lone dissent to Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Co. v. Baugh. 120 But the architect of its demise was Justice
Holmes.
Holmes’s first volley was his dissent in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.,
which rejected the concept of general common law. 121 “The law of a state
does not become something outside of the state court, and independent of
it, by being called the common law. Whatever it is called, it is the law as
declared by the state judges, and nothing else.” 122 The second was his
dissent in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, which doubled-down on the
same claim. 123 “The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the
sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can
be identified, although some decisions with which I have disagreed seem
to me to have forgotten the fact.” 124 And the third was his dissent in Black
& White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., which referred to general common law as a “subtle fallacy.” 125 “In
117. Id. at 18.
118. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893) (extending general
common law to tort) and Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349 (1910) (extending general common
law to property).
119. Purcell, Jr., supra note 11, at 23-24
120. Baugh, 149 U.S. at 391.
121. Kuhn, 215 U.S. at 371.
122. Id. at 372.
123. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 218 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 222.
125. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 532 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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my opinion the authority and only authority is the State, and if that be so,
the voice adopted by the State as its own should utter the last word.” 126
While Holmes could not quite convince the Court to overrule Swift
v. Tyson, he provided the ammunition for a generation of criticism that
made it almost inevitable. Gradually, Swift v. Tyson became a symbol of
corporate power and the overreach of the federal courts. And as President
Roosevelt filled the court with progressive justices, a majority to overrule
Swift v. Tyson gradually formed. And when Erie v. Tompkins came along,
they made their move.
M. Erie’s Thwarted Settlement Attempts
According to several accounts, at some point after Tompkins won at
trial, Erie tried to settle. But it is unclear when Erie tried to settle, how
many times it tried to settle, how much it offered, and whether Tompkins’s
lawyers kept him fully informed. In 1976, a law student paraphrased
Danzig’s written recollections:
As the date for argument before the Supreme Court grew near, the
railroad apparently made on [sic] last effort to end the case through the
back door. While Tompkins’ lawyers were sitting at their offices at 32
Broadway, the railroad had apparently sent an emissary to the plaintiff.
A man in Tompkins’ hometown who owned a local gas station went to
Tompkins’ house with the message that the railroad would drop its
petition for certiorari if he would accept a settlement of $22,000. Danzig
and Nemeroff reacted with a fitting countermove. They sent for
Tompkins, and secreted him in a hotel near Masapequa [sic], Long
Island, where he could be protected from the enticements of the railroad.
There he stayed for several weeks, until the “danger” of early settlement
passed. Both Nemeroff and Danzig were sure that the judgment of
$30,000 was as good as won, with interests and costs. 127

In 1978, a law professor paraphrased Nemeroff’s oral recollections:
Not long after [the trial], Nemeroff received a phone call from
Tompkins. The owner of the Hughestown gas station had come to him,
said Tompkins, and reported that a friend who worked for the railroad
wanted Tompkins to know that the railroad was ready to pay $7500 to
settle the case. The sum was enormous to Tompkins, but Nemeroff
advised him that it was paltry: only a quarter of the jury’s verdict and
small compensation for a lost right arm. Tompkins seemed unpersuaded.
Fearful that he might yield to temptation, Nemeroff invited Tompkins to
126.
127.

Id. at 535.
Rizzi, supra note 11 (paraphrasing Danzig’s unpublished memoir).
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visit Baldwin, New York, where Nemeroff then lived. Tompkins
accepted. He arrived the next afternoon. Nemeroff put him up at a local
rooming house for a few days and then installed him in the Nemeroff
guest room, where he stayed for two weeks. By then the appeal was
fairly under way. The danger of a precipitate settlement had passed.
Tompkins returned to Pennsylvania. 128

And in 1988, Danzig himself recalled the despair and astonishment
he felt when the Supreme Court granted certiorari. “But we were still
optimistic. A gas station attendant had approached Harry Tompkins and
told him he could get him several thousand dollars to settle. Bernie hid
Harry for weeks in an old hotel in Freeport, L.I., to prevent them from
getting to him.” 129
Obviously, these three accounts differ in several material respects.
While Nemeroff claimed Erie tried to settle soon after the trial for about a
quarter of the verdict, Danzig claimed it tried to settle after the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, either for a pittance or for more than two-thirds
of the verdict. Of course, it is possible that Erie made multiple attempts to
settle. But all three accounts involve a gas station owner or attendant
approaching Tompkins with a settlement offer, which suggests that there
was only one settlement attempt.
Also, one wonders why Erie used a Hughestown gas station owner
or attendant to convey its settlement offer to Tompkins. Danzig and
Nemeroff implied that Erie was trying to trick Tompkins into settling by
avoiding his lawyers, but maybe Erie was trying to send Tompkins a
message his lawyers refused to deliver. While it is misconduct for a lawyer
to initiate ex parte contacts with a represented party, it is also misconduct
for a lawyer not to communicate a settlement offer. Danzig and Nemeroff
both describe sequestering Tompkins in Long Island, in order to prevent
him from agreeing to a settlement. At the very least, it suggests that they
may not have given him complete and unbiased information about Erie’s
settlement offers.
N.

The Supreme Court Briefs

A new printed record was prepared for the Supreme Court, and both
parties filed briefs. Erie’s brief argued that the district court should have
applied the Pennsylvania law making Tompkins a trespasser, rather than

128. Younger, supra note 11, at 1021-22 (summarizing an April 2, 1978 conversation with
Nemeroff).
129. Danzig, supra note 18.
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the general common law rule making him a licensee. 130 Erie explicitly
recognized the objections to Swift v. Tyson:
It is no doubt possible to collect isolated statements of this Court
seeming to authorize a virtually complete disregard of state court
decisions in the field of general law. It may be conceded that many of
the criticisms of the supposed doctrine of Swift v. Tyson (16 Pet. 1) and
succeeding cases proceed upon the assumption that these cases sanction
this sweeping disregard of state court decisions. It would be idle to deny
that some of the cases go to considerable lengths in overriding state court
decisions. 131

But Erie chose to distinguish Swift v. Tyson, rather than question its
legitimacy. “We do not question the finality of the holding of this Court
in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet. 1) 1, that the ‘laws of the several States’
referred to in the Rules of Decision Act do not include state court
decisions as such.” 132
Specifically, Erie focused on Justice Story’s claim in Swift v. Tyson
that no “firmly established” state common law rule had governed the issue
before the court. 133 Accordingly, Erie argued that federal courts sitting in
diversity should resort to general common law “only when the pertinent
principle or rule of law has not been definitely settled, foreclosed or
established so as to have become a rule of property, action or conduct in
the state.” 134 A long line of Pennsylvania cases “firmly established” that
a person using a path parallel to a railroad track was a trespasser. And if
the Pennsylvania common law rule was “firmly established,” then under
Swift v. Tyson, the lower courts should have applied it. 135
Tompkins’s brief made a much simpler argument. 136 Under Swift v.
Tyson, the lower courts correctly applied the general common law rule
that a person using a path next to a railroad track is a licensee.137

130. Erie’s counsel before the Supreme Court were William C. Cannon, Theodore Kiendl, and
Harold W. Bissell. Petitioner’s Brief.
131. Petitioner’s Brief at 24.
132. Petitioner’s Brief at 27.
133. Swift, 41 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1842).
134. Brief for Petitioner at 35, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1937) (No. 367).
135. Id. at 15-22.
136. Tompkins’s counsel before the Supreme Court were Alexander L. Strouse, Fred H. Rees,
and Bernard G. Nemeroff. Tompkins’s brief was written by Bernard Kaufman, William Walsh, and
Aaron L. Danzig. Brief for Respondent, Erie Railroad Company v. Harry J. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1937) (No. 367).
137. Id. at 5-17.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss2/12

44

Frye: The Ballad of Harry James Tompkins

2018]

THE BALLAD OF HARRY JAMES TOMPKINS

575

Accordingly, the district court properly held that negligence was a
question for the jury, and its verdict should stand. 138
O.

The Oral Argument

On the morning of January 31, 1938, the Supreme Court inducted
Justice Stanley Reed to replace Justice George Sutherland. And then it
heard oral argument in Erie v. Tompkins.
Kiendl appeared for Erie, and Rees appeared for Tompkins.
Unfortunately, no transcript of the oral argument is known to exist. 139 But
luckily, some anecdotal accounts of the oral argument were preserved.
Apparently, Tompkins’s lawyers had no idea why the Supreme Court
granted certiorari, and were blindsided by the Court’s focus on Swift v.
Tyson. And they believed the same was true of Kiendl. As Danzig
observed:
The simple fact was that neither we nor anyone in the gigantic law firm
of Davis, Polk knew why the petition had been granted. When Mr.
Kiendl argued the case before the Supreme Court, he was questioned at
length by the Court about Swift. He had no idea what they were driving
at, acknowledging that it was good law, but arguing it didn’t apply
here. 140

In a letter to Frederick C. Hicks of Yale Law School, Kiendl explained:
After the granting of the petition for certiorari we were faced with the
dilemma of attacking the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson directly or
endeavoring to suggest that this doctrine was inapplicable to the instant
case. Convinced that a head-on attack might be fatal, we decided to
present the case based on the argument we had available, which you
have found in our main brief.
At the time of the oral argument, I had not proceeded very far before
Mr. Justice Brandeis pointedly inquired about our views with regard to
the Swift v. Tyson case. In the ensuing discussion I could not refrain
138. Id. at 28-33.
139. The Supreme Court began creating audio recordings of oral arguments in the October Term
of 1955. Before 1955, the Supreme Court allowed parties to create stenographic transcripts at their
own expense. Some of the parties who chose to create a transcript also provided a courtesy copy to
the Supreme Court. See Zvi S. Rosen, Transcripts of Supreme Court Oral Arguments from Before
OT1955 – They Exist!, MOSTLY IP HISTORY, April 20, 2017, http://www.zvirosen.com/
2017/04/20/transcripts-of-supreme-court-oral-arguments-from-before-ot1955-they-exist/
[https://perma.cc/2H8Y-LXJK]. There is no evidence that Tompkins or Erie chose to create a
transcript and no transcript is known to exist. However, Kiendl apparently destroyed his files when
the case, as was his customary practice. FREYER, supra note 111.
140. Danzig, supra note 18.
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from expressing my view that the doctrine of that case was unfortunate
in its consequences but that nevertheless its acceptance by so many
courts for so many years precluded me from suggesting that the doctrine
be overruled. Practically all the members of the Court then participated
in a discussion of Swift v. Tyson, and a large part of my argument
revolved about it. 141

According to Elliott Cheatham of Vanderbilt Law School:
I talked with two Columbia Law School men who were in the case. Mr.
Aaron Denzig [sic], one of my former students, who wrote the brief for
Tompkins and whom I saw some months after the decision, sputtered:
‘The Court took a thirty thousand dollar verdict away from our client
without ever letting us brief the issue on which the Court went.’ Mr.
Kiendl, counsel for the Erie Railroad, said that both sides had briefed
the case on the assumption that Swift (as commonly understood) was
controlling and the determinant was whether the common law of
Pennsylvania in question concerned a subject of ‘general’ law. A couple
of minutes after he began the oral argument, Justice Brandeis leaned
over and asked, ‘Mr. Kiendl, do you think Swift v. Tyson was rightly
decided?’ This was the first intimation anyone had that the Swift case
would be questioned. 142

Despite Kiendl’s claim to have been blindsided by the Court’s focus
on the legitimacy of Swift v. Tyson, some commentators have speculated
that he was actually trying to avoid a Hobson’s choice. Maybe he knew
the Court wanted to overrule Swift v. Tyson, and was trying his best to
both win the case and preserve a favorable precedent. For example,
Edward Purcell has observed that Kiendl apparently refused to question
the legitimacy of Swift v. Tyson even after Brandeis explicitly asked
whether it should be overruled. “Despite Brandeis’s direct invitation - and
the promise of automatic victory if Swift were overturned - Kiendl still
refused to criticize the case. Indeed, he actually argued that Swift was too
well-established even to be questioned.” 143
According to Purcell:
He knew that his client would rather pay $30,000 than see the ‘general’
law interred. Like other national corporations, the Erie Railroad put a
high value on the Swift doctrine and wanted to preserve it at all costs. It

141. FREDERICK C. HICKS, MATERIALS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 376 (Lawyers
Cooperative Pub. Co. 3d ed. 1942).
142. Elliott Cheatham, Comments by Elliott Cheatham on the True National Common Law, 18
AM. U. L. REV. 372 (1969).
143. Purcell, Jr., supra note 11, at 47-48.
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was understandable, then, why Kiendl’s brief not only failed to attack
Swift, but defended it explicitly. 144

On Purcell’s reading, at oral argument, Kiendl was horrified to realize that
he was poised to win a pyrrhic victory:
The explanation for Kiendl’s tactic is straightforward: he did not want
Swift overruled. He shaped his response in the oral argument so blandly
for the same reason that he crafted his brief to avoid questioning Swift’s
continued authority. His paramount goal in litigating Erie was,
ironically, not to defeat Tompkins but to preserve Swift v. Tyson.” 145

In other words, Purcell infers that Kiendl was trying to thread the
needle. His “clever and sophisticated” strategy” and “brilliant” lawyering
were intended to “enable his client to triumph on narrow grounds in
Tompkins’s suit while safeguarding the Swift doctrine for its continued
use in future disputes.” 146 If it had worked, “Kiendl would have saved the
railroad the substantial sum of $30,000 while at the same time preserving
the ‘general’ law that served its interests in the great majority of cases.” 147
And Kiendl’s profession of ignorance was merely an effort to save face,
“In retrospect, it seems likely that Kiendl offered his after-the-fact
explanations for an entirely understandable reason. He sought to mask his
true strategy in order to portray himself more favorably. He preferred to
be seen as a surprised winner than an overreaching lover.” 148
I am not convinced. While Purcell’s theory is clever, I find it too
clever by half. Hindsight bias makes it “obvious” that the Supreme Court
was angling to overturn Swift v. Tyson. But was it obvious to the actual
litigants? I doubt it. There is certainly no direct evidence that Kiendl
expected the Court to overturn Swift v. Tyson, even after it granted
certiorari. And if he did, surely he would have advised Erie not to pursue
an appeal. After all, if Erie valued Swift v. Tyson so highly, $30,000 seems
like a small price to preserve it. The idea that Kiendl’s strategy was to
knowingly chart a course between Scylla and Charybdis seems less
“brilliant” than foolhardy.
Kiendl’s reluctance to question the legitimacy of Swift v. Tyson is no
evidence to the contrary, but rather reflects cautious lawyering. I am

144. Id. at 48.
145. See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION:
ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 99-100 (2000).
146. Purcell, Jr., supra note 11, at 48.
147. Id. at 49.
148. Id.
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reminded of the oral argument in Dalmazzi v. United States, when Justice
Kennedy asked petitioner’s counsel Stephen Vladeck, “Do you think
Marbury versus Madison is right?” 149 Vladeck wisely demurred, and I
suspect Kiendl did the same. If the Court intends to overrule long-standing
precedent, it will do so irrespective of the parties, who are almost always
well-advised to offer the narrow grounds on which they can prevail.
And in any case, was Swift v. Tyson and the general common law
really so valuable to the railroads? Certainly not in Erie v. Tompkins. The
Pennsylvania rule that Tompkins wanted to avoid came from somewhere,
presumably the advocacy of the railroads. If they could influence state law
to their particular advantage, why prefer a general common law over
which they may have had less control? After all, from the railroad’s
perspective, the real problem in Erie v. Tompkins was not its duty of care
per se, but the fact that the action went to the jury.
In theory, the timing and amount of Erie’s settlement offer could
provide objective information about its assessment of Tompkins’s action.
A relatively small offer soon after the trial would suggest that Erie was
confident of its prospects on appeal. A relatively small offer after the
Supreme Court granted certiorari would suggest that Erie expected the
Court to reverse. And a relatively large offer after the Supreme Court
granted certiorari would suggest that Erie either expected the Supreme
Court to affirm, or expected it to reverse on undesirable grounds.
Unfortunately, in the face of conflicting accounts of the settlement offer,
it is impossible to know what actually happened.
But Erie’s apparent decision not to pay for the creation of a transcript
of the oral argument at least suggests that Kiendl did not realize that the
Court intended to overrule Swift v. Tyson prior to the oral argument. While
only a limited number of Supreme Court litigants chose to pay for the
creation of a transcript, many of the existing transcripts are for major
constitutional cases. 150 This suggests that parties were more likely to pay
for a transcript if they expected a case to be important. The possibility of
the Court overruling Swift v. Tyson would surely be sufficient to motivate
the creation of a transcript, especially for a party as wealthy as Erie and a
firm as prominent as Davis Polk. 151

149. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Dalmazzi v. United States, 585 S.Ct._____ (2018)
(No. 16-961).
150. See Rosen, supra note 143.
151. It is possible that Erie did pay for the creation of a transcript and Kiendl destroyed it with
the rest of his files. But it seems unlikely, because it would defeat the purpose of creating a transcript
in the first place.
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VII.THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
When the Justices of the Supreme Court met to discuss Erie v.
Tompkins on February 5, 1938, Chief Justice Hughes “laid the case before
the conference with the comment, ‘If we wish to overrule Swift v. Tyson,
here is our opportunity.’” 152 And the Court seized that opportunity.
Justices Hughes, Stone, Roberts, and Brandeis were determined to
overrule Swift v. Tyson, and saw Erie v. Tompkins as the perfect vehicle.
Justices Reed and Black also wanted to overrule Swift v. Tyson, but didn’t
want to deny Tompkins his judgment. Only Justices Butler and
McReynolds wanted to affirm and preserve Swift v. Tyson. 153 Chief Justice
Hughes assigned the opinion to Brandeis, the most determined opponent
of Swift v. Tyson.
While a majority of the Justices wanted to overrule Swift v. Tyson,
they didn’t necessarily agree about why it should be overruled. Sometime
before February 11, Stone wrote to Black that the “basis of our decision
in the Pennsylvania railroad accident case is that we follow local law when
it is well enough defined so that we know what it is.” 154 In other words,
Stone initially thought the Court had adopted Kiendl’s argument that
federal courts sitting in diversity should apply well-established state
common law rules. And based on their ultimate dissent, Butler and
McReynolds apparently agreed.
Brandeis began drafting his opinion in Erie v. Tompkins on about
February 28, with a goal of releasing the opinion on about March 28. His
initial drafts were narrow. “The only matters requiring consideration are
the alleged Pennsylvania law and whether it should govern cases tried in
the federal courts.” 155 But the draft opinions gradually became more
expansive, and began referring to the “unconstitutionality” of Swift v.
Tyson. 156 And his fifth draft stated, “The question for decision is whether
the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now be disapproved.” 157
And on March 17, 1938, Brandeis circulated a draft opinion to the Court,
overruling Swift v. Tyson as unconstitutional.
Justices Reed and Stone agreed that federal courts sitting in diversity
should not ignore state common law, but disagreed with Brandeis’s
152. MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 710 (1952) (citing June 4, 1947 interview with
Charles Evans Hughes).
153. Id. at 710 (citing June 4, 1947 interview with Charles Evans Hughes).
154. ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 478 (1956) (quoting
letter from Stone to Black).
155. FREYER, supra note 111, at 132 (quoting Brandeis draft).
156. Id.
157. Id..
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conclusion that Congress could not require them to apply rules
inconsistent with state law. 158 Reed was adamant in his opposition,
ultimately writing an opinion concurring in the outcome, but observing
that it was unnecessary to find Swift v. Tyson unconstitutional, because
the Court could reach the same conclusion by simply changing its
interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act. 159
Stone was more ambivalent, admitting that it might be
unconstitutional for Congress to create general common law rules for
federal courts, but observing that it was unnecessary to reach that
conclusion. Notably, Stone also presciently observed that it would be hard
for the Court to distinguish between substantive and procedural rules. But
Stone eventually came around, when Brandeis accepted his suggested
change, acknowledging that Congress had failed to correct the Court’s
unconstitutional interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act in Swift v.
Tyson. 160
In addition, Tompkins’s fate clearly worried some of the Justices. In
particular, Justice Black wrote a letter to Brandeis expressing concern
about the impact of the Court’s decision on Tompkins’s claim:
My dear Justice Brandeis:
Your requiem over Swift v. Tyson is one of your best - and that is saying
much. While I am not always in agreement with the opinions delivered
by my Alabama predecessors, Mr. Justice McKinley and Mr. Justice
Campbell, I am personally very happy that their dissents mentioned in
your Note 1, will now be in accord with “the law of the land.” I hope
that sometime hereafter this Court may deliver another opinion in
harmony with the spirit and purport of the dissents of Mr. Justice
McKinley and Mr. Justice Campbell, respectively, in the cases of Bank
of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters 519, 597 to 606, and Dodge v. Woolsey,
18 Howard 331, 362, 380.
I hesitate to make a suggestion in connection with your decision and
personally hope that not a word will be changed relating to the last
repose of Swift v. Tyson. I hope that there may be no misunderstanding
as to the application to this particular case which might bring about an
unintentional injury to the injured litigant. On page 2 of the opinion in
the first paragraph, and on page 8 in the fourth paragraph the issue is
stated as limited to the single question as to whether injury sustained on
158. Id. (citing letter from Reed to Brandeis, March 21, 1938; letter from Reed to Brandeis,
March 23, 1938; letter from Brandeis to Reed, March 24, 1938; letter from Stone to Brandeis, March
23, 1938; and letter from Stone to Brandeis, March 25, 1938).
159. Erie, 304 U.S. 64, 90.
160. FREYER, supra note 111, at 138.
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a “longitudinal pathway” relieves the railroad from liability under
Pennsylvania law. The respondent rather forcefully insisted on Pages 26
and 27 of his brief that the Falchetti case was not applicable to the facts
involved in this particular case because it was “uncontested in the case
at bar that plaintiff was at the intersection of a diagonal and a
longitudinal pathway when he was struck.” [Page 27]. I am wondering
if you would feel justified in inserting something to show this fact on
Page 2, where you say, “Tompkins denied that any such rule had been
established by the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts.” If it could be
shown that this Court realized there was a further controversy as to the
applicability of the Falchetti rule, I believe that it would prevent anyone
from reaching the conclusion that this Court was attempting to foreclose
any further consideration of Pennsylvania law as to the facts in this case.
With kind regards, I am Sincerely,
Hugo L. Black 161

Responding to Black’s suggestion, Brandeis asked his clerk William
Claytor to research Pennsylvania law and determine whether it would be
possible for Tompkins to recover if the case were retried. Claytor wrote a
memorandum concluding that it would not. He found no basis for “Justice
Black’s theory” that something in the facts would enable Tompkins to
recover on retrial, because the Pennsylvania rule was “very strict.”
Nevertheless, he conceded, “I suppose that a new trial must be granted.”162
Apparently, Black accepted Claytor’s conclusion, as he joined Brandeis’s
majority opinion. 163
Butler responded with a dissent disputing every element of
Brandeis’s opinion. 164 But his primary focus was Brandeis’s conclusion
that the Rules of Decision Act was unconstitutional. According to Butler,
the Court should have adopted Kiendl’s argument that Swift v. Tyson did
not apply because Pennsylvania law was well-established. 165
In response to Butler’s dissent, Brandeis clarified that the Court was
not questioning the constitutionality of the Rules of Decision Act, only
the Court’s own interpretation of the statute. “In disapproving [Swift v.
161. Letter from Justice Black to Justice Brandeis, March 22, 1938.
162. FREYER, supra note 111, at 132 (quoting memorandum “Pennsylvania Law” from William
Claytor to Louis Brandeis).
163. It seems that Black accepted Tompkins’s loss as a necessary sacrifice to federalism. In a
September 25, 1942 speech to the Missouri Bar Association, he observed, “The decision marks the
expression of a particular legal philosophy, a philosophy which believes that laws governing isolated
legal transactions should spring from the customs, habits, and experiences of a people.” Hugo L.
Black, Address of U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Hugo L. Black to the Missouri Bar Annual
Banquet, 64 J. Mo. B. 26 (2008).
164. Erie, 304 U.S. 64, 80. McReynolds joined Butler’s dissent.
165. FREYER, supra note 111, at 140.
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Tyson] we do not hold unconstitutional [the Rules of Decision Act] . . .
We merely declare that in applying the doctrine this Court and the lower
courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the
Constitution to the several states.” 166
On April 25, 1938, the Supreme Court delivered its opinion in Erie
v. Tompkins, voting 6–2 to reverse Swift v. Tyson and hold that federal
courts sitting in diversity must apply state substantive law. 167 Brandeis
wrote the opinion for the majority, Reed concurred on statutory grounds,
and Butler and McReynolds dissented.
In any case, despite some reservations, the progressive Supreme
Court justices threw Tompkins under the bus, in order to overrule Swift v.
Tyson. Why? Maybe it was just opportunistic. For better or worse, the
Supreme Court often sacrifices the interests of particular parties on the
altar of general principles. But maybe some of the Justices were mollified
by the knowledge that Tompkins was lying?
VIII. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF TOMPKINS’S STORY
Countless scholars have studied the impact of Erie v. Tompkins on
United States law. 168 But relatively few have studied the facts of the actual
case itself. And they have uniformly accepted Tompkins’s account as
true. 169 Was that a mistake?
Of course, as a legal matter, the jury ruled for Tompkins, implicitly
endorsing his story. If a jury verdict is perlocutionary, then Tompkins’s
account became “true” when the jury returned a verdict in his favor. And
it remains “true” today, as the Second Circuit did not reverse the jury’s
findings of fact, only the legal conclusions that followed from those facts.
But “judicial facts” and the truth are not necessarily the same thing.
What actually happened in Hughestown, Pennsylvania at the corner of
Hughes Street and the railroad track at 2:30 a.m. on Friday, July 27, 1934?
Did Harry James Tompkins get hit in the head by the door of a refrigerator
car? Or did he slip and fall while trying to board the Ashley Special?

166. Id. at 141
167. Erie, 304 U.S. 64.
168. As of July 16, 2018, the Westlaw “law reviews” database includes 6,176 citations to Erie
v. Tompkins.
169. See, e.g., Rizzi, supra note 11; Younger, supra note 11; Luzerne Legal Register Report,
supra note 11; Purcell, Jr., supra note 11.
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Social Visit

Tompkins testified that he walked from his house at 7 Hughes Street
in Hughestown to Alice Newhart’s house at 31 Memorial Street in Exeter
at about 6 p.m., and then began walking home at about 12:30 or 1:00 a.m.
While Tompkins estimated the distance as about 5 or 6 miles, it is actually
about 2 miles.
It is plausible that Tompkins would have visited his sick mother-inlaw in the early evening, especially given that it was only a 2 mile walk.
However, it seems a little unusual for him to stay at her house until 12:30
or 1:00 a.m. before walking home. Perhaps he waited until she retired to
bed. In any case, neither Edith Tompkins nor Alice Newhart were deposed
or testified to corroborate Tompkins’s account of the visit.
B.

A Chance Encounter

Tompkins, Harrington, and Schultz testified that Harrington and
Schultz were driving home, when they saw Tompkins on the Fort Jenkins
bridge and gave him a ride to the Rock Street crossing. According to
Harrington and Schultz, they left Harvey’s Lake and began driving to
Hughestown sometime after midnight on July 27, 1934. At about 1:30
a.m., while crossing the Fort Jenkins Bridge, they saw Tompkins, and
stopped to give him a ride home.
It is plausible that Harrington and Schultz were driving home late at
night from Harvey’s Lake. After all, it was a popular summer resort, with
a casino and other attractions. And it is plausible that if Harrington and
Schultz saw Tompkins while driving home, they would give him a ride.
After all, he was a friend, and his house was on their way home. But it is
also a remarkable coincidence.
Harrington and Schultz testified primarily to corroborate Tompkins’s
claim that he was walking home from Exeter at 2 a.m., and to explain why
Tompkins used the path next to the railroad track, rather than Searle
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Street. But Harrington refused to talk to Erie’s investigators, and refused
to be deposed.
Q. Did the railroad come to see you about the case, Mr. Harrington?
A. Why yes, they did, I believe, the two gentlemen in the house there,
yes.
Q. You refused to tell them anything?
A. I told them that if my testimony was wanted I would give it.
Q. They asked you to give it and you refused to give it to them, didn’t
you?
A. I believe I did. I don’t believe I even asked them to sit down.
Q. You know you refused to give them any information when they called
and asked you what you knew about this accident?
A. I told—
Q. Listen to me. You refused to give them any information when they
asked you what if anything you knew about this accident; isn’t that so?
A. I am answering it the best way I can. I told you that I told them that
if my testimony was wanted I would give it in court when the time came.
Q. They said to you in substance, “So you refuse to tell us anything about
it” and you said, “I do”? Isn’t that what occurred?
A. Well, am I being tried? I don’t understand.
Q. Are you being tried? I am trying to get some information from you
as to what you said and did. Did the railroad come to you and ask you
for some information and did you point blank refuse to give them any?
A. Just as I told you. I told them I would give it if I were called as a
witness.
Q. Didn’t they ask you to give it to them?
A. In other words, I refused, if that is what you mean, yes, sir. 170

Harrington’s refusal to cooperate with Erie’s investigation is interesting.
Perhaps he was simply a hostile witness who didn’t want to help Erie. But
maybe he was trying to help protect Tompkins’s story by hampering
Erie’s investigation.
C.

A Short Walk

Harrington and Schultz testified that they dropped Tompkins on the
east side of the Rock Street crossing at about 2 a.m. Tompkins testified
that he crossed back over to the west side of the railroad track, and began
walking north on the footpath from Rock Street to Hughes Street. When
he was about halfway to the stub-end of Hughes Street, he heard the
170. R., supra note 3, at 110-11. Schultz was not deposed either, but it is unclear whether he
cooperated with Erie’s investigation. To Take Depositions in Big Damage Suit, PITTSTON GAZETTE,
Jan. 24, 1935, at 5.
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whistle of the southbound Ashley Special and saw its oncoming headlight.
Just before he reached Hughes Street, the engine passed him. Tompkins
testified that the train was traveling at about 30 miles per hour, about a
foot away from him, but he did not step off the footpath, because the
ground in the railroad right of way was rough and he was afraid of injuring
himself. Colwell testified that the Ashley Special often traveled at about
30 miles per hour at the Rock Street crossing.
This account is false or implausible in several respects. First, it is
impossible that the Ashley Special was traveling 30 miles per hour. In
fact, it was traveling at about 8 to 10 miles per hour. The distance from
Avoca Station to Ashley Station was about 16 miles, and the total running
time on July 27, 1934 was about 90 minutes, for an average speed of about
10 miles per hour. 171 The approach to the Rock Street crossing from
Avoca Station was uphill and around a curve, which forced the train to
slow down. The conductor testified that the Ashley Special was traveling
at about 8 to 10 miles per hour, and the flagman testified that it was not
capable of traveling any faster than 8 to 10 miles per hour as it approached
the Rock Street crossing from Avoca Station, because of the uphill
grade. 172
Second, it is implausible that Tompkins would have stayed on the
path while a train was passing, especially at night. A person on the path
would be only 1 or 2 feet from a passing train, a terrifying and dangerous
prospect. When Tompkins and his witnesses insisted that people routinely
stayed on the footpath while trains were passing, they were lying. And
everyone knew it. Kiendl’s incredulity at their testimony was neither
masked nor feigned. Erie’s witnesses were telling the truth when they
stated that pedestrians stepped off the path when trains were passing. As
Kiendl observed and the photographs introduced into evidence reflect, the
railroad right of way was reasonably smooth and perfectly walkable.
There was nothing to prevent people from using it when a train was
passing.
Third, Tompkins’s testimony implies that he should have reached
Hughes Street before the train reached him. The path was about 115 feet
long. According to Tompkins, he saw the train and heard its whistle when
he was about halfway to Hughes Street. A normal walking pace is about
4 miles per hour, or about 6 feet per second. The Ashley Special was
traveling at most about 10 miles per hour, or about 15 feet per second.
171. On July 27, 1934, the Ashley Special left Avoca Station at 2:10 a.m. and arrived at Ashley
Station at 4:40 a.m., with about an hour delay, for a total running time of about 90 minutes, which
was the typical running time. R., supra note 3, at 284-87.
172. Id. at 288, 315.
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And a person standing on the railroad track at the stub-end of Hughes
Street could see about 400 feet down the track toward Avoca. 173 If
Tompkins saw the Ashley Special when he was about halfway down the
path, it would have taken him about 10 seconds to walk the 60 feet to
Hughes Street, if he maintained a normal pace. But it would have taken
the Ashley Special at least 23 seconds to travel the 350 feet to Hughes
Street. In other words, based on Tompkins’s own testimony, he should
have been out of harm’s way long before the train arrived.
D.

An Accident

Tompkins testified that when he was only about 5 or 10 feet away
from Hughes Street, a dark object protruding from the Ashley Special—
probably an unsecured refrigerator car door— struck him in the head and
knocked him unconscious. When he fell to the ground, his right arm fell
under the wheels of the train, and was severed just below the shoulder.
Colwell testified that he found Tompkins about 5 to 10 feet from Hughes
Street.
Nothing about this story adds up.
First, Tompkins’s injuries are impossible to square with his account
of what happened. He suffered a deep cut on his right temple and a severed
right arm. If the Ashley Special had been traveling at 30 miles per hour
when the refrigerator car door hit Tompkins, it would have caused
massive head trauma that he almost certainly could not have survived. Of
course, the Ashley Special was actually traveling at about 8 or 10 miles
per hour. But even at that speed, the refrigerator car door would have
caused a very serious head injury, including skull fractures. It would be
the equivalent of sprinting headfirst into a brick wall. Tompkins had no
such injury. In addition, the impact with a refrigerator car door would have
knocked Tompkins away from the train, not under it.
Second, while Tompkins claimed he was injured by an unsecured
refrigerator car door, Erie’s records showed that all of the doors were
secured. Given that the records were created before Erie was aware of
Tompkins’s injury, there is no reason to believe they were falsified.
Third, on July 27, 1934, the first refrigerator car on the Ashley
Special was the fifteenth car. Each car was 40 feet long, so with 14 cars,
a coal tender, and the locomotive in front of it, the first refrigerator car
was about 640 feet from the front of the train. The only way the door of

173.

Id. at 271.
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that refrigerator car could have hit Tompkins was if he had stood still and
waited for it.
E.

A Rescue

Almost immediately after the accident, two “boys,” presumably
young men, given that they were out alone at 2:30 in the morning—found
Tompkins on the railroad track. They alerted Colwell to the accident,
asked Mrs. Rentford to call an ambulance, and then disappeared. Who
were these young men? Why were they at the stub-end of Hughes Street
and the railroad track at 2:30 a.m.? How did they find Tompkins so
quickly? If they lived in the neighborhood, why could not Colwell identify
them, and why would he have had to tell them who owned a telephone?
And what did Colwell’s wife mean when she said they were “crazy”?
F.

A Revisionist Account

What really happened in Hughestown, Pennsylvania at the corner of
Hughes Street and the railroad track at 2:30 a.m. on Friday, July 27, 1934?
I suspect that Tompkins was trying to board the Ashley Special and ride
it into Wilkes-Barre to look for work, when he slipped and fell. He hit his
head on the ground, and his right arm fell under the wheels of the train.
The Rock Street crossing, and the end of Hughes Street in particular,
were a perfect place to hop aboard the Ashley Special. The train was
traveling relatively slowly as it labored uphill and around a curve. There
were no streetlights, and little traffic. And there was a convenient path
running alongside the railroad track, perfect for running next to the train.
Notably, the engineer operating the Ashley Special did not see
Tompkins walking on the footpath next to the railroad track. And
curiously, Tompkins was injured right at the intersection of Hughes Street
and the railroad tracks. If he had been walking home, it would have been
particularly easy to step aside for the train. But if he were trying to board
the train, better to hide behind the picket fence.
The young men who found Tompkins may have been hoboes, which
would explain why Colwell did not know them, and why they
disappeared. Presumably, they were either trying to board the train
themselves, or hopped off when they saw Tompkins slip and fall.
In the early 20th century, it was common for people to hitchhike on
trains, especially freight trains. And the number of people riding the rails
spiked in the 1930s, as unemployment spiked during the Depression, and
made it increasingly necessary for people to travel to look for work. But
it was also extremely dangerous, and produced many casualties:

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

57

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 12

588

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:531

It is quite astonishing to realize that trespasser fatalities per head of
population were ten times higher than current levels in the 1920s and
1930s. In part this is explained by the large numbers of hoboes who rode
the trains during the depression years. It is also true that more people
were exposed to trespassing risks earlier this century because the
railroads served a mass market, and provided extensive freight and
passenger service to small communities. 174

In the 1930s, thousands of people were killed or injured every year while
riding trains:
H.L. Denton, general superintendent of police of the Baltimore & Ohio,
read a paper on ‘The Railroad Trespass Evil.’ He said that during the
past two years there has been a very large increase in the number of adult
trespassers, due to general business conditions, many good citizens
going from one community to another seeking employment. Due to the
inadequacy of laws covering trespassing in many communities, railroad
are in a position where they can do little other than eject trespassers from
the property. He felt that a great deal of good work can be accomplished
if employees could be educated to understand that in the interest of
safety it is as much their job to warn the trespasser as it is that of the
police officer. Very little result has been obtained in reducing accidents
to trespassers in the past ten years. In 1921 the number killed was 2,481
and 3,071 were injured, and in 1931 there were 2,401 killed and 3,321
injured. In the last year and a half the police departments of 90 railroads
made 213,353 arrests, a large portion of which were for trespassing. 175

While casualty rates fell dramatically in the 1920s, from about 100 per 10
million miles traveled to about 40 per million miles traveled, they spiked
to 80 per million miles traveled in the 1930s. 176
The most plausible explanation for Tompkins’s accident is that he
was trying to climb aboard the Ashley Special when he slipped and fell.
Notably, Hunt alluded to hoboes on a couple of occasions. For example,
he referred to refrigerator cars as “reefers,” a hobo term also used by
railroad employees, and referred to a boxcar as a “side door palace car,” a
term used primarily by hoboes. 177 Furthermore, Kiendl asked Tompkins
whether he was attracted to trains, which Tompkins denied:
Q. You have seen railroad trains going through time and time again?
A. Yes, sir.

174.
175.
176.
177.

IAN SAVAGE, THE ECONOMICS OF RAILROAD SAFETY 15-16 (1988).
Annual Meeting A.R.A. Safety Section, 93 Railway Age 505 (1932).
Savage, supra note 178, at Figure 2 (Trespassing on the Railroad).
R., supra note 3, at 263.
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Q. And I suppose like most young men, they attracted your attention?
A. No, sir, they never attracted my attention. I have seen too many of
them. 178

Indeed, Kiendl’s questions implied that he believed Tompkins was trying
to board the train when he slipped and fell:
Q. Let us see if we get that straight, Mr. Tompkins. The object was about
two feet wide and it was about five or six feet high; right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And it hit you just in the right eye?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: That is the only place?
A: Right through (indicating).
Q: It didn’t hit you any other place in the body?
A: My head was all swollen. I wasn’t cut in my eye.
Q: It hit you in the side of the face?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: It didn’t hit your body at all?
A: My leg was cut up here and here (indicating).
Q: You don’t know whether it was from that dark object?
A: No.
Q: Or whether it was from the fact that you fell down and were dragged
along?
A: No, sir.
Q: You don’t know whether the swelling on the side of your eye was
from this object hitting your face, do you?
A: No, sir. 179

The question in Erie v. Tompkins was whether to apply the
Pennsylvania rule that a person walking on a path parallel to a railroad
track was a trespasser, which was affirmed in Falchetti v. Pennsylvania
Railroad. 180 But the plaintiff in Falchetti was a 6 year old boy who was
killed by a train while playing unsupervised in a railroad right of way. 181
The claim that John L. Falchetti “was struck by the overhang of the
cylinder head on one of defendant’s passing engines, while he was
walking longitudinally on its right-of-way, immediately adjacent to its
tracks” is just as implausible as Tompkins’s claim that he was injured by
an unsecured railroad car door while walking home. In truth, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was removing from the jury the right to

178.
179.
180.
181.
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award tort damages to those injured by railroads while in the right of way,
including both unsupervised children and trespassers, like Tompkins.
The true story of Erie v. Tompkins is probably that everyone knew
Tompkins was injured while trying to board the Ashley Special. After all,
riding trains was both incredibly common and incredibly dangerous. But
Judge Mandelbaum did not care, and neither did the jury. Tompkins was
poor, Erie was rich, and the jury decided accordingly. The Second Circuit
almost said as much in its opinion. And it probably gave the progressive
justices some comfort when they stole Tompkins’s judgment from under
his nose.
IX. THE AFTERMATH OF ERIE V. TOMPKINS
Initially, Erie v. Tompkins was ignored. The popular press was
entirely indifferent to it, and the legal press just noted it as another
important decision. Indeed, Justice Frankfurter was quite surprised by the
lack of fanfare, writing to President Roosevelt:
I certainly didn’t expect to live to see the day when the Court would
announce, as they did on Monday, that it itself has usurped power for
nearly a hundred years. And think of not a single New York paper—at
least none that I saw—having a nose for the significance of such a
decision. 182

On April 25, 1938, the Supreme Court remanded Erie v. Tompkins to the
Second Circuit. And on July 12, 1938, the Second Circuit dismissed the
action. Under Erie, it had to apply Pennsylvania law, so Tompkins had to
prove wanton recklessness. 183 Given the facts pleaded by Tompkins, that
was impossible, so the court had to reverse. Tompkins filed a petition for
certiorari, but it was summarily denied, and the case ended on October 24,
1938. 184
Apparently, at some point after the Supreme Court decided Erie,
Kiendl destroyed his files, as was his custom when a case became final. 185
Despite getting reversed, Judge Mandelbaum was immensely proud
of his role in Erie v. Tompkins:
The late John Cahill once told this writer that in arguing before
Mandelbaum he once questioned whether the judge correctly
182. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Franklin D. Roosevelt (April 27, 1938), reprinted in
MELVIN I. UROFSKY & DAVID W. LEVY, HALF BROTHER, HALF SON: THE LETTERS OF
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS TO FELIX FRANKFURTER 455-56 (M. Freedman ed. 1967).
183. Tompkins v. Erie R. Co., 98 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1938).
184. Tompkins v. Erie R. Co., 305 U.S. 637 (1938).
185. FREYER, supra note 111, at 142 (1981).
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understood a principle of law in question. Cahill said Mandelbaum
smiled at him indulgently and asked: “Mr. Cahill, did you ever hear of
a case, Erie v. Tompkins.”
“Of course, your honor,” said Cahill.
“Do you know, Mr. Cahill, who was the trial judge in that case?”
“I’m not sure, your Honor,” said Cahill.
“I was,” said Mandelbaum “and Learned Hand and Judge Swan agreed
with me, even though the Supreme Court later on got a little confused
and reversed us. So don’t tell me I don’t understand the law!” 186

In his copy of Volume 304 of the United States Reports, Mandelbaum
wrote in the margin of Erie v. Tompkins, “Because the Swift Tyson case
although before this case I never knew of its existence to be truthful and
for the confusion this decision brought about, it might have been better to
leave it alone and stand by good old Swifty.” 187
When the United States entered the Second World War, the Army
classified Tompkins 4-F, unfit for service for medical reasons. During the
war, Tompkins had a job, but he lost it when the war ended. He eventually
learned to compensate for his missing arm, and enjoyed fishing in the
Susquehanna River.
It was said that he would tie the line using his teeth and he would ready
his bait with his hand, while he carefully tucked the hook in his shoe.
Harry is also remembered in Hughestown for his great soul and the
passion that he had for music. He loved to sing. 188

Tompkins died on August 27, 1961. 189 While none of his obituaries
mentioned his accident or his role in Erie v. Tompkins, they followed a
standard form that included few personal details.
In 1960, the Erie Railroad Company merged with the Delaware,
Lackawanna & Western Railroad and became the Erie-Lackawanna
Railroad. In 1972, the Erie-Lackawanna filed for bankruptcy, from which
it never recovered. In 1976, the United States purchased most of the ErieLackawanna’s remaining assets, which became part of the Consolidated
Rail Corporation, also known as Conrail.

186. Gould, supra note 59, at 1.
187. Id.
188. Luzerne Legal Register Report, supra note 11 (recollections of Michael I. Butera).
189. Harry Tompkins Dies in Hospital, WILKES-BARRE TIMES LEADER, August 28, 1961, at 1;
Harry Tompkins, PITTSTON GAZETTE, August 31, 1961, at 12.
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Hughes Street facing north, remaining railroad track on the right.

Hughes Street facing north, from Rock Street.
Eventually, the railroad track running through Hughestown was
decommissioned. While much of the track remains in place, the track
running from the Rock Street crossing to Hughes Street was removed, and
Hughes Street was extended along the former right of way and connected
to Rock Street.
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On October 13, 1997, the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum
Commission installed a historical marker commemorating Erie Railroad
Company v. Tompkins and Tompkins’s accident on Rock Street, near the
former Rock Street crossing. 190 It reads as follows:

190. Christopher Romanelli, Historical marker honors court battle, THE TIMES LEADER
WILKES-BARRE, October 14, 1997, at 6.
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In a landmark decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1938 that, in
cases between citizens of different states, federal courts must apply state
common law, not federal “general common law.” Under Pennsylvania
common law, Harry Tompkins of Hughestown lost his case against the
Erie Railroad, a New York State company. Tompkins had been struck
by an unsecured door of a passing train and severely injured near this
spot on July 27, 1934.

Is that what really happened to Tompkins? Maybe so. But maybe not.
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APPENDIX

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2
Photograph taken with camera 50 feet west of crossing and 150 feet
from point of accident, looking east.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

65

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 12

596

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:531

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3
Photograph taken with camera 100 feet east from point of accident,
looking west.
The camera was located at Hughes Street and depicts the railroad
tracks leading to Rock Street. The solid line to the right of the railroad
track indicates the path on which Tompkins was walking. The dotted lines
indicate the paths from Colwell’s gate to Rock Street and to the path next
to the railroad track. “P” indicates where Colwell found Tompkins. “V1”
indicates the window through which Colwell saw Tompkins. “V2”
indicates Colwell’s gate. “V3” indicates the ditch in front of Colwell’s
picket fence.
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Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4
Photograph of Rock Street Crossing, Hughes Street to the right.

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5
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Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6

Defendant’s Exhibits A & B
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Defendant’s Exhibit C[1]

Photograph taken with camera over Rock Street, 5 feet north from
near rail, looking east.
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Defendant’s Exhibit C[2]

Photograph taken with camera over center of Rock Street, 15 feet
north from near rail, looking east.
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Defendant’s Exhibit C[3]
Photograph taken with camera over center of Rock Street, 25 feet
north from near rail, looking east.
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Defendant’s Exhibit C[4]
Photograph taken with camera over center of Rock Street, 35 feet
north from near rail, looking east.
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Defendant’s Exhibit C[5]
Photograph with camera over center of Rock Street,50 feet north
from near rail, looking east.
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Defendant’s Exhibit C[6]

Photograph taken with camera 20 feet north from near rail, and about
75 feet east from center of Rock Street, looking west.

Defendant’s Exhibit D[1]

Photograph taken looking east.
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Plaintiff’s Exhibit D[2]

Plaintiff’s Exhibit D[3]
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